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PREVENTION AND CURE 
Michael Pappas*
          Laws can address harms in two distinct yet intersecting ways. They 
may intervene to prevent harms from occurring, or they may allow harms 
to arise and then try to cure them. 
          Whether operating separately or in tandem, prevention and cure 
approaches pervade laws, policies, and individual actions. A landlord 
may exercise prevention via a “no pets” policy, or she may opt for cure 
by requiring pet owners to pay a damage deposit and cleaning fee. 
Alternatively, a combination of prevention and cure governs motorist 
behavior. Speed limits seek to prevent accidents while negligence 
liability provides compensation for accident victims. Further, climate-
change policies seek to prevent climate-impacts by curtailing 
greenhouse-gas emissions, and they attempt to cure climate-harms via 
disaster assistance. 
          Prevention and cure are ubiquitous, but their features and 
relationship are underexplored. This Article changes that. It investigates 
prevention and cure to provide a novel framework for assessing and 
enhancing the structure of law and policy. This informs policy design 
across a range of substantive areas. It identifies situations that counsel 
predominant prevention or cure approaches, and it uncovers mutually 
reinforcing prevention-and-cure combinations. Further, the Article 
applies the prevention-and-cure framework to explain and critique policy 
domains ranging from motorist behavior to climate change. This 
perspective particularly illuminates how the various legal and policy 
responses to climate change interrelate, and how they miss opportunities 
to align complementary prevention and cure measures. It identifies how 
relatively small structural changes can conjoin seemingly disparate 
climate-change regulations, liabilities, programs, and precautions into a 
cohesive policy landscape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When do we want a rule of “don’t touch” and when do we want 
“you break it, you buy it”? When “do not enter” and when “leave it 
like you found it”? When “no dogs” and when “pet deposit plus 
cleaning fee”? Put another way, when should we prevent harms, 
avoiding them at the cost of foreclosed opportunity, and when should 
we let actions proceed relatively unconstrained, seeking to cure 
problems that arise? 
Prevention and cure approaches pervade both private behavior 
and public and private law. Most basically, prevention seeks to avoid 
harms, and cure seeks to remedy harms. This Article contends that 
prevention and cure are foundational concepts for law and policy, and 
that appreciating structures of prevention and cure can explain and 
improve law across numerous substantive areas. 
Consider a few contemporary examples. Should policies 
drastically curtail greenhouse gas emissions to avert the harms of 
climate change, or should emissions persist as they may, with society 
reacting to climate impacts that arise? Should some speech be 
restricted, or should all speech be free of limitations other than liability 
for damages? Should breakthrough pharmaceuticals hit markets 
immediately, or should they be unavailable until approved? Should 
land development be governed by planning and zoning laws, or should 
courts just resolve conflicts as needed? Should internet platforms 
screen user-uploaded content for copyright violations, or should they 
simply take down infringing material upon notice from a copyright 
holder? These debates sound in different fields, but underlying them 
all is the choice among prevention and cure strategies. 
From parenting decisions to policy preferences, the prevention-
and-cure framework applies broadly. Indeed, ideological divides often 
track inclinations toward prevention or cure. For instance, arguments 
(typically from the political left) for urban planning, pollution control, 
consumer protection, and regulatory oversight appear to embrace the 
idiom that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”1 
 
 1. See An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anounceofpreventionisworthapoundofcure (last 
visited June 4, 2021) (describing the idiom). For examples of arguments that appear to embrace the 
idiom, see, e.g., Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 897, 910–11; Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental 
Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 589 (2002). 
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Alternately, arguments (typically from the political right) for 
deregulation,2 entrepreneurial opportunity, cutting red tape, and 
limiting government embrace an “I’ll clean up after myself” (or, 
possibly, “better to ask forgiveness than permission”) approach rooted 
in cure. 
To crystalize the distinction between prevention and cure, 
imagine two extreme policies. First, consider a pure prevention 
regime. This would constrain all potentially harm-causing behavior 
and would avoid many harms. However, it would almost surely fail to 
contain all antisocial behavior, and it would foreclose much 
potentially beneficial activity.3 
Alternatively, consider an extreme cure regime. It would impose 
no limits on behavior, maximizing autonomy to act, but it would 
require that any resulting harms be remedied.4 The prospect of cure 
obligations would incentivize actors to take some precautions, but 
invariably some irreparable harms would arise. 
These hypotheticals showcase the divergence between prevention 
and cure as well as their respective limitations, illustrating why 
prevention and cure approaches rarely operate in isolation. While 
individual prevention and cure measures can sometimes be substitutes, 
policy structures typically combine complementary prevention and 
cure approaches. Thus, revisiting the question “when do we want a 
rule of ‘don’t touch’ and when do we want ‘you break it, you buy it,’” 
most often we will want to deploy elements of both. This Article 
details when and how laws can do so. 
By building the conceptual framework of prevention and cure, the 
Article illuminates the core architecture of law and policy, providing 
both descriptive and prescriptive insights. Descriptively, the Article 
exposes recurrent structures of prevention and cure that underlie legal 
doctrines across diverse substantive areas. Using the prevention-and-
cure framework, the Article explains a sweeping range of common-
 
 2. See, e.g., Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era—An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 
559, 559 (2009) (explaining changes in political attitudes towards regulation following the 2008 
financial crisis). 
 3. Cf. David Fouse, Do Public Heath Protections Infringe on Freedoms?, PUB. HEALTH 
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:18 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20180821110740/http:// 
www.publichealthnewswire.org/?p=1630 (describing the tension between public health regulations 
and personal freedom). 
 4. See Catherine A. Hardee, Considering Consequences: Autonomy’s Missing Half, 43 PEPP. 
L. REV. 785, 788 (2016). 
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law, statutory, and constitutional principles. For instance, among 
many other examples, the Article clarifies climate change law and 
policy, applying the framework to make sense of major climate change 
litigation and regulation, elucidate key differences in cap-and-trade 
and carbon-tax policies, and uncover connections between disaster 
assistance and tort liability. Moreover, the prevention-and-cure 
framework offers a structure to understand not only individual legal 
approaches but also relationships among policies. Accordingly, the 
Article analytically (and graphically) maps interlinked policy 
landscapes surrounding climate change and other policy contexts. 
Prescriptively, the prevention-and-cure framework helps enhance 
policy design. It identifies scenarios suggesting predominant 
prevention or cure approaches, and it recommends effective 
combinations of prevention and cure. Further, it diagnoses structural 
policy gaps where prevention and cure measures fail to reinforce each 
other. For example, it illuminates how the various legal and policy 
responses to climate change interrelate, and how they miss 
opportunities to align complementary prevention and cure measures. 
Further, it reveals relatively small structural changes that can knit 
seemingly disparate climate change regulations, liabilities, programs, 
and precautions into a cohesive policy landscape. Through this and 
other applications, the prevention-and-cure framework offers a 
theoretical and practical lens to explain, critique, and improve law and 
policy. 
Additionally, the prevention-and-cure framework advances 
multiple strains of academic literature. It bridges legal philosophy,5 
law and economics,6 and numerous public- and private-law doctrines, 
including tort, property, contract, constitutional law, and 
environmental law. It also weaves together prominent lines of 
scholarship addressing the relationship of risk and harm,7 the roles of 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 184 (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, Modelling the Choice Between Regulation 
and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare, 37 CANADIAN J. ECON. 590, 590–612 (2004). 
 7. See, e.g., ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 103–10 
(2001); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 257 
(1993); Nuno Garoupa & Marie Obidzinski, The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of 
Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions 1–17 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 5899, 
2006). 
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private liability and public regulation,8 and the deployment of property 
rules and liability rules.9 
Finally, the prevention-and-cure framework makes novel 
contributions through its expansive scope. Building on prior 
scholarship that focused primarily on tort and property law,10 this 
framework transcends substantive legal domains. Moreover, this 
breadth comes with depth. The Article considers multiple policy-
design variables, both individually and in combination, yielding a 
more expansive model and more refined observations than did prior 
work.11 Additionally, whereas previous literature offered relatively 
static comparisons of binary regimes,12 this Article provides dynamic 
analysis of how different policy choices compare, interconnect, and 
feedback upon each other. Finally, the Article incorporates a plurality 
of values into the prevention-and-cure framework, making it adaptable 
to a variety of normative commitments beyond the primarily utilitarian 
focus of previous analyses.13 
Structurally, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I establishes the 
prevention-and-cure framework. It outlines the basic distinction, and 
it surveys diverse examples of prevention and cure approaches. It also 
highlights key interrelations between prevention and cure. 
Part II considers how different normative values influence 
preferences for prevention and cure. It expounds how positivist, 
utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice commitments 
generate competing conceptions of “harm,” and it identifies scenarios 
that call for predominant prevention or cure strategies. 
Next, Part III examines the practical limitations of prevention and 
cure. It surveys how prevention and cure measures may be either over-
 
 8. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 357, 357 (1984); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice 
Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 193–211 (1977). 
 9. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 71 
(1996). 
 10. See supra notes 7–9. 
 11. Earlier related work typically considered binary policy regimes along an individual 
dimension, for example juxtaposing public regulation and private liability. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
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inclusive or under-inclusive and how this may frustrate various 
normative commitments. 
Finally, Part IV provides insights for designing integrated 
prevention and cure strategies. It explores variations of prevention and 
cure, such as 1) internal or external implementation, 2) property-rule 
or liability-rule enforcement, 3) ex-ante or ex-post timing, and 4) 
actor-presumption or victim-presumption. It also details how 
particular complementary prevention and cure measures can combine 
to advance policy goals. Finally, it examines how multiple prevention 
and cure measures can assemble into interconnected policy 
landscapes, and it applies these insights to explain and critique policies 
addressing motorist behavior and climate change. Through this 
application, Part IV demonstrates how disjointed prevention and cure 
measures inhibit climate change policy goals, and it suggests how 
expanding particular cure variations can reinforce climate-policy 
efforts. 
I.  CONCEPTUALIZING PREVENTION AND CURE 
Prevention and cure are trans-substantive14 approaches for 
addressing harm.15 Prevention tries to avoid harms, and cure attempts 
to remedy them. While the two approaches interrelate,16 they are 
nonetheless conceptually distinct. This Part outlines the basic binary 
of prevention and cure, essentializing them to highlight core aspects 
and to underpin subsequent analysis of their nuances. It also applies 
the prevention-and-cure framework to explain legal doctrines and 
economic principles. Finally, it discusses key interrelations between 
prevention and cure. 
A.  The Basic Prevention and Cure Distinction 
Prevention approaches are actions, interventions, or choices that 
seek to avoid harm. Prevention may be private or public. For instance, 
prevention may include precautionary actions (e.g., signs warning of 
a slippery floor), prohibitions on actions (e.g., laws against drunk 
 
 14. “Trans-substantive” refers to a discernible concept that remains consistent across a variety 
of substantive areas. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1197. 
 15. For a discussion of the concept of harm, see infra Part II. 
 16. See infra discussion Section I.A. 
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driving), or conditions on actions (e.g., requirements for construction 
permits). The defining feature of prevention is an attempt to direct 
behavior to avoid negative impacts. Thus, prevention focuses centrally 
on behavior or action. 
Alternatively, cure approaches are efforts to remedy harms, and 
cure too can be private or public. Frequently cure approaches place 
remedial obligations on actors who cause harms. For example, 
negligent drivers who cause automobile accidents face liability. 
However, as a conceptual matter, cure approaches need not track 
causation. For example, hospitals offering emergency services must 
treat harms they did not cause and must provide care even if neither 
the harm-causing party nor the injured party can pay.17 Some cure 
arrangements even have victims provide their own remedies, 
essentially letting harms fall where they may.18 
This reveals the fundamental aspect of cure: it simply reacts to 
harms. While linking cure obligations to harm causation may comport 
with notions of justice or create desirable incentives, cure itself has no 
inherent commitment to causation or avoidance. Thus, whereas 
prevention focuses centrally on directing behavior or action, cure 
focuses centrally on handling the result or damage. This key 
distinction separates prevention and cure and underpins this Article’s 
analytical framework. 
B.  Prevention and Cure in Doctrines, Policies, and Economic 
Principles 
The prevention-and-cure framework exposes recurrent, trans-
substantive structures in legal doctrines, policy configurations, and 
economic principles. This helps explain individual doctrines, doctrinal 
interplay, and policy landscapes. It also allows insights from one area 
of law to inform seemingly unrelated legal contexts. 
1.  Doctrines and Policies 
The prevention-and-cure framing elucidates individual doctrines, 
doctrinal complements and substitutes, and broad policy approaches. 
 
 17. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-guidance/legislation/emtala/ (last modified Mar. 4, 
2021, 11:59 AM). 
 18. See infra Section IV.A.1.b for a discussion of external cure. 
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First, attention to prevention and cure regimes reveals 
nonintuitive links among common-law, constitutional-law, statutory, 
and regulatory doctrines. For instance, the doctrine of negligence 
embodies a cure approach. Individuals may act as they will, but they 
must remedy harms caused by unreasonable behavior. The doctrine of 
nuisance is similar. Individuals have latitude to use property, but when 
conflicts arise, courts assess relative rights and order remedies for 
harms. Additionally, eminent domain and regulatory takings doctrines 
reflect constitutional cure approaches. Both doctrines authorize broad 
government action but require compensation for incursions on private 
property rights. Statutory and regulatory regimes also employ cure 
strategies. For example, Clean Water Act regulations use offsets to 
cure environmental harms; they maintain “no net loss” of wetlands by 
requiring an entity destroying wetlands to create or restore other 
wetlands.19 
Prevention approaches too span common law, constitutional law, 
statutes, and regulations.20 As a broad example, criminal laws 
frequently proscribe certain behavior (e.g., theft) to avoid harms. 
Additionally, trespass doctrines foreclose unpermitted entry onto 
property to prevent physical or dignitary harms. Further, the common-
law standard for issuing injunctions seeks to avoid irreparable harms. 
Numerous constitutional provisions also adopt prevention approaches. 
Article I, Section 10 directs “No State shall enter into any Treaty, 
Alliance, or Confederation,” and this forbids behavior that might harm 
the union or interfere with federal foreign affairs powers.21 Similarly, 
Eleventh Amendment immunity prevents individuals from suing 
states, absent the state’s consent, to avoid harms to sovereignty.22 
Some constitutional doctrines even prevent acts of prevention. For 
example, the presumptive unconstitutionality of “prior restraints” on 
speech23 guards against harm to the free press24 by limiting 
 
 19. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2018). 
 20. Cf. Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 660–61 (2015) 
(explaining different academic approaches to prevention). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 22. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (discussing the history of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). 
 23. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior 
Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 291 
(1999). 
 24. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719–20 (1931). 
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government censorship power. Finally, prevention abounds in 
legislation and regulation. The Clean Water Act prohibits unpermitted 
pollution of navigable waters,25 the 1958 Federal Switchblade Act 
prohibits interstate travel with automatic knives,26 a Louisiana law 
prohibits taking white or albino alligators from the wild,27 and a 
federal regulation requires hair nets and beard covers in certain food-
manufacturing contexts.28 All of these restrict behaviors to prevent an 
array of harms. 
The prevention-and-cure framework also accentuates doctrinal 
complements and substitutes. For instance, laws address potential 
harms from motorist behavior by blending prevention and cure 
approaches. Prohibitions on drunk driving and speeding represent 
straightforward prevention approaches. Laws disallow these behaviors 
to avoid harms. Concurrently, tort liability for accidents represents a 
cure approach. Much driving proceeds with relatively little external 
constraint, and when accidents invariably occur, injured parties turn to 
tort liability29 and automotive insurance30 for remedies. 
Alternately, the contract doctrines of specific performance and 
efficient breach exemplify prevention and cure operating as 
substitutes. Specific performance adopts a prevention approach by 
enforcing a contract to “assure[] that the contractual duty is 
performed.”31 This directs behavior to avoid the harm of breach by 
precluding the breach altogether. 
Conversely, efficient breach exemplifies cure.32 The doctrine 
holds that a party may breach a contract if all parties would be no 
 
 25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (2018). 
 27. LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:280 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Extraordinary Sess.). 
 28. 21 C.F.R. § 110.10(b)(6) (2019). 
 29. Typically, tort liability exemplifies ex-post cure. See infra Section IV.C.1.b. 
 30. Automotive insurance itself provides ex-post cure, but laws mandating that drivers carry 
automotive insurance are a form of ex-ante cure similar to security deposits. See infra Section 
IV.C.1.b. 
 31. See Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract 7 (John 
M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 532, 2005), http://www.law.harva
rd.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_532.pdf. 
 32. The principle of efficient breach provides an example, but some commentators suggest 
that efficient breach is rarely found in practice. See, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, The Process 
Paradigm: Rethinking Medical Malpractice, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 513 (2006); D. Daniel 
Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition 
Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 250 n.83 (2008). However, 
other scholars maintain that even if cases do not label doctrinal rulings as efficient breach per se, 
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worse off (i.e., if the breaching party pays full expectancy damages).33 
For instance, imagine Actor contracts with Victim to supply a product 
worth $100 to Victim (i.e., expectancy damages are $100). Then 
Better Price offers to buy Actor’s product for $210. Actor could breach 
the contract with Victim, pay Victim $100, sell to Better Price for 
$210, and net $110. Under these facts, all parties are as well off (or 
better) if the breach occurs because Actor will completely remedy the 
legally recognized harm to Victim.34 By allowing the breach, subject 
to compensation, efficient breach embraces cure. 
Depending on context, contract law deploys either prevention via 
specific performance (e.g., requiring delivery of unique goods) or cure 
via efficient breach (e.g., requiring expectancy damages for fungible 
goods). 
Finally, the prevention-and-cure framework clarifies major 
policy approaches, such as overarching responses to climate change. 
One policy avenue, termed “climate mitigation,” seeks to avoid 
climate change harms by, for example, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. This represents prevention. Another policy direction, 
termed “climate adaptation,” focuses on navigating the impacts of 
climate change—for example, by relocating communities or 
modifying infrastructure to cope with sea level rise. This tracks cure. 
2.  Economic Principles 
The prevention-and-cure framework also illuminates the two 
standard metrics of economic efficiency, Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks, 
which inform policy analysis and design. Evaluating efficiency under 
the Pareto standard reflects a prevention approach, whereas adopting 
the Kaldor-Hicks standard tends toward cure. 
The Pareto standard asks if a change from the status quo makes 
one party better off while making no one else worse off. If so, the 
change is “Pareto superior.”35 This standard resonates with prevention 
 
the prevalence of expectancy damages represent de facto practice of the efficient breach. See 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS ET AL., LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 74 (2018). 
 33. See, e.g., Efficient Breach, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/efficient 
_breach (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32. 
 34. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE 
L.J. 568 (2006) (discussing utilitarian and moral aspects of efficient breach). 
 35. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 20. 
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because it avoids harms, protecting individuals at the expense of 
foregone opportunity. 
Alternatively, the Kaldor-Hicks standard considers a change 
efficient if it produces more benefits than it does costs, even if the 
change leaves some parties worse off.36 Rather than focusing on 
individuals, as the Pareto standard does, the Kaldor-Hicks approach 
adopts a societal cost-benefit analysis.37 It reasons that if aggregate 
gains exceed aggregate losses, society benefits because gaining parties 
could compensate losing parties (even if they do not actually do so).38 
In this way, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency shares underpinnings with 
cure. Both Kaldor-Hicks and cure allow behavior to proceed based on 
presumptions that harms can be remedied. Additionally, Kaldor-Hicks 
and cure both disassociate remedial obligations from causation: 
Kaldor-Hicks imposes no actual remedial burdens at all, and cure 
regimes need not link remedial duties with causes of harm. 
The prevention-and-cure framework helps distill the respective 
commitments of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks approaches. The 
Kaldor-Hicks standard uses cure concepts to justify exposing 
individuals to harms (e.g., involuntary transfers39) in pursuit of 
collective social advances. Conversely, the preventive Pareto standard 
protects individuals from harm, even at the expense of thwarting 
potential social benefits.40 
C.  Interplay Between Prevention and Cure 
The previous sections outlined the defining distinctions between 
prevention and cure. This section describes two important ways that 
they interrelate: 1) cure obligations create incentives for prevention, 
and 2) since prevention efforts cannot eliminate harms, they leave 
room for cure. 
First, cure incentivizes prevention. Actors frequently avoid harms 
to obviate the costs of cure. Indeed, economic analysis of tort law has 
long suggested that the prospect of liability (i.e., cure) leads actors to 
 
 36. Id. at 21. 
 37. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE 
L.J. 165, 170 (1999). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 190. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 170. 
 40. STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 20–21; Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 188. 
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invest in cost-effective precautions (i.e., prevention).41 For example, 
concern over tort liability may lead the owner of a swimming pool to 
build a precautionary fence around the pool. 
Additionally, prevention leaves room for cure because prevention 
measures cannot completely eliminate harms. Indeed, attempts to do 
so would be costly and futile.42 Even focused, effective prevention 
efforts will not result in full compliance. As long as there is driving, 
there will likely be some drunk driving. Additionally, because of 
residual risk, some harms are essentially unpreventable. Some car 
crashes will occur despite safe driving; some well-made, properly-
used products will malfunction; and some workers will be hurt even 
at safe jobsites. Cure is the only option to address such unpreventable 
harms.43 
These connections between prevention and cure are enormously 
important for policy design, and subsequent sections address them in 
more detail. 
II.  PREVENTION AND CURE ACROSS DIVERSE VALUES 
The prevention-and-cure framework transcends not only different 
substantive contexts but also diverse values. This Part examines how 
differing normative commitments generate competing conceptions of 
“harm,” which in turn yield different preferences for prevention and 
cure approaches. It also identifies scenarios that call for predominant 
prevention or cure strategies. 
A.  Normative Commitments and Conceptions of Harm 
Laws and policies rely on prevention and cure structures to 
address harms. This necessitates some underlying concept of “harm” 
to guide the deployment of prevention or cure approaches. However, 
ideas of harm are unfixed and inherently contestable. As philosopher 
Joel Feinberg observed, “harm” may represent a nonnormative, value-
neutral “setback to interests,” or it may represent a normative 
 
 41. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 73–78; Shavell, supra note 8. 
 42. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, 
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 93 
(1989) (explaining the impossibility of eliminating health and safety risks ). 
 43. Cf. id. (citing cure via compensation as an “important social objective”). 
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“wrong.”44 Either way, harm takes shape only in relation to the 
interests that are “setback” or the values that are “wronged.”45 
This section surveys how influential normative commitments 
shape notions of harm. It considers how positivist, utilitarian, natural 
rights,46 and distributive justice perspectives yield particular 
conceptions of harm. It also analyzes how these ideas of harm 
influence prevention and cure approaches by applying them to 
examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, and climate change. 
1.  Positivism 
Positivism roots the legitimacy of laws in social authorities (e.g., 
legislatures) rather than in background morals or principles.47 For a 
positivist, any law duly enacted by a recognized authority is valid.48 
Thus, positivism exalts process49 and typically defers to lawmaking 
bodies. However, positivism need not entail rubberstamping, 
particularly in the face of political-process dysfunctions. Rather, 
positivist commitments can accommodate concerns over interest-
group influence and rent seeking.50 
The concept of harm, from a positivist perspective, also centers 
on duly enacted laws. Legal proscriptions and liabilities define harms 
and determine the prevention and cure measures to address such 
harms. 
 
 44. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 31 
(1987). 
 45. Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 114 (1999) (explaining historical change in attitudes toward harm). 
 46. This Article adopts the term “natural rights” to include what is commonly conceived of as 
“natural law,” with its religious-based morality roots, as well as more secular conceptions of 
morality. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Restoring the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J. 
732, 737–49 (2007) (providing the history of natural law theory); George, supra note 5 (analyzing 
natural law theories through a lens of morality). 
 47. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–86 (2d ed. 1994); see also Michael 
Baur, Beyond Standard Legal Positivism and “Aggressive” Natural Law: Some Thoughts on Judge 
O’Scannlain’s “Third Way,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1538–39 (2011) (arguing that positivism 
flows from natural law). 
 48. Cf. Baur, supra note 47, at 1529–30 (explaining that legal positivism recognizes a law’s 
validity through social facts or conventions, not norms or moral principles). 
 49. See, e.g., Randolph Marshall Collins, The Constitutionality of Flag Burning: Can Neutral 
Values Protect First Amendment Principles?, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 887, 894 (1991); William N. 
Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1014 (1989). 
 50. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the 
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 459–63 (1992). 
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To illustrate positivist conceptions of harm and their implications 
for prevention and cure, consider examples of eminent domain, drunk 
driving, and climate change. 
First, imagine an exercise of eminent domain to condemn 
Owner’s home. Further, imagine that Owner subjectively values her 
home well above its market value and that she disagrees with the 
condemnation’s purpose. From a positivist perspective, no harm arises 
as long as the government pays Owner fair market value and the 
condemnation fits the legal definition of “public use.” This is because 
the Fifth Amendment allows condemnation for public use if just 
compensation (i.e., market value) is paid.51 So, even though Owner 
suffers subjective losses and believes the condemnation illegitimate, 
no legally cognizable (i.e., positivist) harm arises. 
Alternatively, a positivist harm would arise if the condemnation 
contravened the Fifth Amendment, either by lacking a public-use 
justification or failing to provide just compensation.52 To address such 
harm, positivism would prescribe either prevention or cure, depending 
on the relevant law. In this case, Fifth Amendment doctrine would 
invalidate (i.e., prevent) a condemnation that lacks a public-use 
justification. However, it would order payment (i.e., cure) for a 
condemnation that fails to provide just compensation. 
Moving to the example of drunk driving, because it is illegal, the 
act of drunk driving itself constitutes a positivist harm, regardless of 
whether physical injury results. Moreover, laws address this harm 
through both prevention (e.g., prohibitions and fines) and cure (e.g., 
negligence per se and dram shop liability). Absent the prohibitions and 
liabilities particular to drunk driving, the action itself would not 
constitute a positivist harm. 
Finally, in the context of climate change, positivism explains the 
divergent results in the two Supreme Court cases regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions, Massachusetts v. EPA53 and American 
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.54 In both cases, plaintiffs asserted 
harms from unchecked emissions, and the Court decided both cases 
 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 54. 564 U.S. 410 (2011) [hereinafter AEP]. 
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through positivist application of the Clean Air Act (CAA).55 In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found unregulated greenhouse gas 
emissions were a harm because the CAA required EPA to address such 
emissions.56 The Court prevented57 further harm by ordering EPA to 
comply with the CAA.58 Conversely, in AEP v. Connecticut, the Court 
held that unregulated greenhouse gas emissions could not constitute a 
public-nuisance harm because the CAA displaced such common-law 
claims.59 In both cases, positivist statutory application determined 
whether unregulated emissions were a cognizable harm.60 
2.  Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism seeks to maximize social welfare61 by achieving 
“the greatest amount of good for the greatest number.”62 To do so, 
utilitarian analysis weighs all the costs and benefits (broadly defined) 
of policy options and pursues the course that yields the greatest net 
benefit. To compare dissimilar costs and benefits,63 utilitarianism 
requires some universal metric, and economic measures typically 
serve as the common currency. Thus, economic analysis is a primary 
evaluative tool for utilitarianism.64 
Harm, to a utilitarian, is any cost that detracts from social 
welfare.65 This means that utilitarian conceptions of harm can extend 
 
 55. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; AEP, 564 U.S. at 418–20. 
 56. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 57. This is an example of ex-post prevention, addressed further infra Section IV.A.3.a. 
 58. EPA, 549 U.S. at 535. 
 59. AEP, 564 U.S. at 420–23. 
 60. Id. at 425; EPA, 549 U.S. at 528. 
 61. Though utilitarianism and positivism are often associated, utilitarianism is outcome-driven 
whereas positivism is agnostic towards laws’ impacts. See, e.g., Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics 
Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 914–15 (1995) 
(discussing the links between positivism and utilitarianism). 
 62. Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/. 
 63. For a discussion of the difficulty in determining comparative utilitarian benefit, see Adler 
& Posner, supra note 37. 
 64. Cf., e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (6th ed. 2012) 
(providing an overview of the impact of economics on the analysis and practice of law); Avery 
Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2239 
(1996) (describing the influence of economics on the law); Jules L. Coleman, Crimes and 
Transactions, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 921, 927 (2000) (explaining the relationship between economics 
and criminality). 
 65. Cf. Driver, supra note 62 (explaining that the focus of utilitarianism is to “maximize the 
overall good”). 
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beyond positivist ones. For instance, utilitarian analysis views 
subjective and intangible losses as harms, even if such losses are not 
legally recognized harms.66 
Utilitarianism addresses harms differently at the individual and 
social level. Utilitarianism seeks to avoid (i.e. prevent) harms to net 
social welfare, even if that means allowing some particular individual 
harms. The justification is that the overall social benefit offsets (i.e. 
cures) the individual harms.67 Accordingly, to a utilitarian, the choice 
between prevention and cure regimes is necessarily an empirical 
question.68 
Revisiting the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, and 
climate change helps explain. First, recall the hypothetical eminent-
domain condemnation of Owner’s home, and recall that Owner 
subjectively values her home above its market value. From a utilitarian 
perspective, the homeowner’s loss of subjective value is a harm. 
However, the utilitarian response to this harm depends on a 
broader measurement of social welfare. For instance, imagine that the 
condemnation is to build a lightly trafficked highway that will also 
require condemnation of other homes.69 If the aggregate costs (all 
homeowners’ subjective losses plus highway construction costs) 
outweigh the aggregate benefits (a little-used highway), the 
condemnation causes net social harm. Utilitarian analysis calls for 
preventing the condemnations and highway project. 
Alternatively, imagine that the highway would benefit many 
people and would require only the condemnation of Owner’s home. If 
the highway’s aggregate benefits now exceed its costs (Owner’s 
subjective losses plus highway construction costs), the condemnation 
 
 66. Utilitarian conceptions of harm may also be narrower than positivist ones, such as when 
positive law identifies a harm in a scenario that utilitarianism views as merely distributional. For 
example, if a law requires that an insurance company cover certain losses, but the insurance 
company refuses to pay the policyholder for such losses, then the policyholder has suffered a harm 
in a positivist sense but not necessarily in a utilitarian sense. From a utilitarian standpoint, unless 
the payment impacts net social welfare, then the issue is merely distributional and creates no social 
harm. 
 67. See supra discussion Section I.B.2. 
 68. Utilitarian analysis should also consider the costs of administering different combinations 
of prevention and cure approaches. 
 69. Baltimore’s “road to nowhere” serves as an unfortunate example of such a project. See 
Johnny Miller, Roads to Nowhere: How Infrastructure Built on American Inequality, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 23, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/feb/21/roads-nowhere-
infrastructure-american-inequality. 
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represents a net social gain. Here, utilitarianism supports the 
condemnation and considers the net benefits to effectively cure 
Owner’s harms. 
Crucially, in both scenarios, Owner’s harms are identical. 
However, the utilitarian response to these harms, whether via 
prevention or cure, varies based on the social welfare context. 
Moving to the example of drunk driving, such behavior represents 
a utilitarian harm only when it decreases social welfare. Thus, 
utilitarianism would prevent drunk driving to an optimal point where 
the aggregate costs (broadly defined) of both drunk driving and its 
prevention efforts are lowest. At that point, some drunk driving would 
likely still occur, but utilitarian analysis would not consider those 
instances a social harm because eliminating them would be costlier 
than allowing them. 
Finally, utilitarian analysis of climate change asks whether 
greenhouse gas emissions cause net losses or net gains, and empirical 
disagreement over this question causes major climate-policy 
divergence. If, as some prominent economists argue, climate change 
costs outweigh the benefits of current greenhouse gas emissions, then 
climate change is a social harm.70 Accordingly, utilitarianism suggests 
preventing the harm by reducing emissions to the point where their 
benefits exceed projected climate change costs. Proposed climate 
policies like the Waxman-Markey Bill71 and the Obama-era Clean 
Power Plan72 generally followed this utilitarian approach. Both aimed 
to eliminate lower-value emissions to reduce climate change costs 
while retaining the greatest benefits from remaining emissions. 
However, if, as some economists assume, the benefits of current 
emissions outstrip climate change costs,73 then utilitarian analysis 
suggests development gains are worth climate impacts.74 If so, 
 
 70. See, e.g., Expert Report of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ph.D. at 7, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-
cv-01517-TC (D. Or. June 28, 2018), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/document_cw_01-2.pdf. 
 71. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009). 
 72. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: CUTTING CARBON 
POLLUTION FROM POWER PLANTS, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2015-
08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 73. Matthew Rendall, Discounting, Climate Change, and the Ecological Fallacy, 129 ETHICS 
441, 444 (2019) (“Economists commonly assume that economic growth will leave future 
generations richer than the present one, in spite of climate change.”). 
 74. But see id. at 444–45 (criticizing this premise). 
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emission reductions are unwarranted because enhanced social welfare 
theoretically cures climate-related losses. Under these assumptions, 
utilitarianism supports Trump Administration policies that minimally 
restrict emissions75 or bypass climate change analysis76 in pursuit of 
economic growth. 
Though seemingly antithetical, the divergent emissions policies 
described above share consistent utilitarian concepts of harm and 
criteria for deploying prevention or cure. The policy differences 
manifest from conflicting estimates of aggregate costs and benefits. 
3.  Natural Rights 
From a natural rights perspective, laws must comport with 
principles of morality, right action, or justice. Procedures alone cannot 
legitimize laws, as with positivism, nor are all values fungible in 
pursuit of social welfare, as with utilitarianism.77 Rather, a natural 
rights approach holds that valid laws must adhere to certain essential 
normative standards.78 
This section focuses on particular natural rights commitments to 
individual liberty and autonomy, which emerge as common themes 
across diverse natural rights theories.79 Such concepts of liberty and 
autonomy are considered essential to “integral human fulfillment”80 
because they entail “the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s 
life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and 
not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces.”81 
Further, these liberty and autonomy values are inclusive, 
 
 75. Dallas Burtraw & Amelia Keyes, 10 Big Little Flaws in EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy 
Rule, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (July 22, 2019), https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/10-big-
little-flaws-in-epas-affordable-clean-energy-rule/. 
 76. Lisa Friedman, Trump Rule Would Exclude Climate Change in Infrastructure Planning, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/climate/trump-nepa-climate-
change.html. 
 77. Cf. George, supra note 5, at 184 (explaining that natural law is fundamentally concerned 
with incommensurable “basic human goods”). 
 78. Cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 171 (discussing a cost-benefit analysis approach to 
crafting regulations). 
 79. See James Donato, Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 1517, 1517 (1988) (noting that natural rights theories can be rooted in sources ranging from 
god and nature to secular “history and community structure”). 
 80. George, supra note 5, at 172. 
 81. John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (June 29, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral; see JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 371–74 (1988). 
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encompassing both potential actors’ “freedom to” act and potential 
victims’ “freedom from” subjugation.82 
Given natural rights’ commitments to liberty, a natural rights 
harm is any undue incursion on liberty. As for what constitutes an 
undue incursion, that depends on one’s underlying concept of 
autonomy, and two influential moral-political theories offer prominent 
standards for measuring natural rights harm. These theories are the 
“neutralist” and “legal moralist” approaches.83 
Under the neutralist approach,84 a harm to the liberty of potential 
actors arises from any state coercion that constrains behavior absent 
injury to others.85 Further, a harm to the liberty of potential victims 
arises from any behavior that actually causes injury.86 
Alternatively, from a legal moralist perspective, harms to the 
liberty of potential victims (including individuals or society at large) 
arise when actions transgress moral principles.87 In such cases, the 
“wrong”88 or “sin”89 constitutes a harm even in the absence of 
identifiable injury to others.90 Harms to the liberty of potential actors 
occur only when moral action is foreclosed. 
Though neutralists and legal moralists identify harms differently, 
both approaches, and natural rights perspectives in general, address 
harms similarly. They embrace prevention and eschew cure. 
Legal moralist perspectives adopt prevention both to ensure 
moral behavior (protecting potential victims) and to enable choices 
within moral bounds (protecting potential actors).91 For example, 
Robert George has offered legal moralist arguments both for laws 
 
 82. Cf. Christman, supra note 81 (explaining that “[p]ersonal (or individual) autonomy should 
also be distinguished from freedom”). 
 83. Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 662 (2000). 
 84. Id. at 666. 
 85. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68–69 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) 
(1859). See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 662, 666; Harcourt, supra note 45, at 109, 110, 131. 
 86. MILL, supra note 85, at 68–69. See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 666; Harcourt, supra note 
45, at 131. 
 87. See Harcourt, supra note 45, at 116–25. 
 88. See FEINBERG, supra note 44, at 34. 
 89. Harcourt, supra note 45, at 125 (quoting Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in 
The Enforcement of Morals 22 (1965)). 
 90. See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 667–70. 
 91. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 45, at 173–75; Robert P. George, Ruling to Serve: A 
Fundamental Argument for Limited Government, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2013/04/ruling-to-serve. 
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suppressing pornography92 (i.e. preventing wrongs) and against laws 
mandating sex education for children (i.e. preventing limitations on 
acceptable behavior).93 
Neutralists also employ prevention, both to protect potential 
actors from government oppression and to protect potential victims 
from identifiable harms.94 For instance, neutralism welcomes policies 
disallowing censorship or prohibiting assault. However, as prevention 
measures become more attenuated from actual harm, they risk 
breaching neutralist principles.95 For example, a prohibition on 
transporting automatic knives96 violates neutralist tenets because it 
proscribes action that causes no injury. 
Unlike prevention, cure grates with natural rights principles, 
whether legal-moralist, neutralist, or otherwise. While cure may 
appear to protect both potential actors (by limiting behavioral 
constraints) and victims (through the prospect of remedy), cure 
fundamentally contradicts natural rights commitments to autonomy by 
forcing harmed parties into involuntary exchanges of rights. 
Cure, by its nature, imposes a transactional relationship and 
plunges parties into a market. In a cure scenario, the occurrence of 
harm compels an exchange between the harmer and harmed. Both 
parties must join the relationship, but only the harmer has the agency 
to initiate it (by causing the harm). So even if the harmed can choose 
her price,97 which is not guaranteed,98 the forced transaction gives 
harmers excessive liberty at the expense of the harmed.99 This 
 
 92. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
MORALITY 188 (1993). 
 93. See, e.g., Robert P. George, 2018 President’s Essay: Returning to Our Principles, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/article/2018-presidents-essay-
returning-our-principles. 
 94. MILL, supra note 85, at 68–69 (Mill’s harm principle expressly recognizes that “power 
can be rightfully exercised . . . to prevent harm to others.” (emphasis added)). 
 95. See id. at 149. For a survey of literature on “risks that fail to materialize as harms,” see 
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1403 n.6 (2007). 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (2018). 
 97. See infra Section IV.A.2. Cf. Coleman, supra note 64, at 924 (explaining that criminal 
conduct constitutes an illegitimate transaction because the actor asserts an authority he does not 
possess). 
 98. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 99. See MILL supra note 85, at 68–69. This can additionally distort self-direction because 
individuals may experience constant anxiety over others’ actions and may alter behavior to avoid 
being victims. 
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exemplifies a “distorting external force[]” undermining autonomy and 
self-determination.100 
Moreover, the transactional nature of cure fundamentally clashes 
with the idea of inviolate natural rights. By creating a system where 
compensation trades against natural rights violations, cure 
commodifies inherently non-fungible values. For instance, legal 
moralism seeks to suppress moral transgressions as inherent 
“wrongs.” However, a cure regime proposes a market for such wrongs, 
allowing parties to sin at will, as long as they pay for the indulgence. 
Similarly, neutralism aims to preserve individuals’ options for self-
fulfillment. Allowing government to curtail such options, if it pays 
reimbursement, contradicts neutralism’s core purpose. 
Reconsidering the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, 
and climate change helps illustrate natural rights conceptions of harm 
and the applicable prevention approaches. Starting with eminent 
domain, from a neutralist perspective, the condemnation of Owner’s 
home constitutes a harm because it coerces Owner despite her causing 
no injury to others. The prospect of compensation (i.e. cure) cannot 
redeem this coercion; rather a neutralist analysis would disallow (i.e. 
prevent) the condemnation. 
A legal moralist approach would reach similar results. Though 
legal moralism permits laws to pursue moral commitments, 
condemning Owner’s home to build a highway fall outside that moral 
authority.101 Thus the condemnation unduly constrains moral action, 
harming autonomy and requiring prevention. 
In the case of drunk driving, the neutralist and legal moralist 
perspectives diverge regarding harm. To a legal moralist, drunk 
driving likely represents an inherent wrong, regardless of its 
consequences. Thus, laws against drunk driving validly prevent 
immoral behavior and do not unduly infringe on liberty. 
 
 100. Cf. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 
1335, 1339 (1986) (discussing how liberty and control are lost when one confers to another the 
ability to diminish the value of one’s resources, subject to compensation); Christman, supra note 
81 (providing an overview of autonomy in political and moral philosophy). 
 101. Cf. George, supra note 91 (explaining the tension between government’s duty to act for 
the common good and individual liberty). 
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For a neutralist, however, not all drunk driving is a harm because 
not all drunk driving injures others.102 As a result, blanket prohibitions 
on drunk driving harm actors by unduly infringing their liberty. 
Therefore, laws prohibiting drunk driving should be replaced (i.e. 
prevented) with more tailored measures that protect the liberty of both 
actors and victims. 
Finally, regarding climate change, from both neutralist and legal 
moralist perspectives it is debatable whether greenhouse gas emissions 
are harms. Climate change threatens to be a distorting external force 
that fetters individuals’ autonomy, and all greenhouse gas emissions 
contribute to climate change. However, the neutralist question is 
whether any particular emission injures an individual. If so, then 
emissions are harms. But, if particular emissions are too attenuated 
from manifest climate injuries, then they are not neutralist harms. 
For a legal moralist, whether emissions are harms depends on 
whether they transgress a given moral code. Of course, this depends 
on one’s particular code, but even holding moral commitments 
constant, the answer is elusive.103 For instance, some Evangelical 
Christians argue the moral necessity of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions,104 while others find emission reductions morally 
reprehensible.105 Thus, natural rights perspectives can differ over 
whether greenhouse gas emissions are harms. 
 
 102. Cf. Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 666 (presenting a theory of neutralism in which the 
government may only employ coercive means, such as criminal sanctions, to prevent choices that 
result in harm to others). A neutralist could take the position that drunk driving always constitutes 
a harm to others (i.e., a harm to the liberty of potential victims) because drunk driving creates a 
likelihood, if not certainty, of injury to potential victims. Adopting this premise, a neutralist could 
justify a prohibition on drunk driving as consistent with the harm principle. 
 103. Cf. Alex Shashkevich, Stanford Research Examines Moral Significance of Actions 
Causing Climate Change, STAN. NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/23/mo
ral-element-climate-change/ (discussing research that aims to create frameworks governments can 
use to evaluate the moral implications of their energy policies). 
 104. See, e.g., Samantha Harrington, Christian Author Sees Climate Change as a Moral Issue, 
YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (July 16, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07
/christian-author-sees-climate-change-as-a-moral-issue/; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate 
Denial Is Immoral, Says Head of US Episcopal Church, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:12 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/24/climate-change-denial-immoral-says-
head-episcopal-church (discussing various religious leaders’ positions that climate denial is 
immoral). 
 105. See, e.g., An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, CORNWALL ALL., 
https://cornwallalliance.org/2009/05/evangelical-declaration-on-global-warming/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021). 
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Assuming emissions are harms, then both legal moralist and 
neutralist perspectives counsel prevention.106 This is the posture taken 
in the well-publicized climate change lawsuit Juliana v. United 
States.107 In that case, the plaintiffs assert a fundamental (and natural) 
right to “a climate system capable of sustaining human life.”108 To 
protect that right, they ask the court to order prevention in the form of 
mandatory government action to remediate greenhouse gas 
emissions.109 
However, if greenhouse gas emissions are not harms, then 
emissions limits themselves harm the liberty of actors and should be 
prevented. Such reasoning appears in prominent Evangelical 
opposition to emissions reduction policies.110 
4.  Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice perspectives maintain that concepts of 
“justice” should guide allocations of burdens and benefits.111 Theorists 
have proposed various normative criteria for just allocations, 
including principles of desert, strict egalitarianism, and feminism.112 
Among these, John Rawls’s “difference principle” remains 
particularly influential.113 Rawls argues that justice requires resource 
 
 106. What level of prevention is a separate and important question. As philosopher Blake 
Francis has observed,  
Carbon dioxide emissions won’t ever go away—we exhale it . . . . So there is nothing 
inherently wrong with emitting carbon dioxide. But there does seem to be something 
terribly wrong with the scale of human emissions since the Industrial Revolution. But at 
the same time, we are all the beneficiaries of incredibly important advancements in 
medicine, science, infrastructure and other areas from the Industrial Revolution.  
Shashkevich, supra note 103. 
 107. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 108. Id. at 1164 (internal quotations omitted). 
 109. Id. at 1164–65. 
 110. See, e.g., An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, supra note 105. 
 111. See, e.g., David Elkins, Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent and Supportable 
Theory of Distributive Justice, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 267, 267 (2007); Julian Lamont & Christi Favor, 
Distributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/; Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective 
Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 535 (1992). 
 112. See, e.g., Lamont & Favor, supra note 111. While some notions of justice may derive from 
natural rights-based principles, including ideas of liberty and autonomy, see, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 169, 174 (2d ed. 2011), this section considers distributive 
justice separately from the liberty-based natural rights commitments. 
 113. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: 
The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 879–80 (1976); 
Christian Barry, Redistribution, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://plato.stanford 
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distributions to aid the worst-off and disrupt the inequitable status 
quo.114 
From a distributive justice perspective, harm arises when a 
distribution conflicts with a given vision of justice. For example, a 
Rawlsian harm arises from any unequal distribution that fails to 
benefit the poorest members of society.115 Alternatively, from a strict 
egalitarian perspective, any unequal allocation constitutes a harm. 
Both prevention and cure can potentially address distributive 
justice harms. All distributive harms are theoretically curable through 
reallocation of resources, and cure is the only option to address both 
preexisting distributive harms, such as entrenched injustices, or 
unavoidable harms, such as natural unfairness in skill or ability.116 
Prevention, in the form of just initial distributions, is possible only for 
ongoing or future allocations.117 
Reconsidering the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, 
and climate change is instructive. From a Rawlsian perspective, 
whether the condemnation of Owner’s home is a harm depends on 
Owner’s status in society and the allocation of benefits from the 
highway project. For instance, if Owner is impoverished and the 
highway will primarily benefit the wealthy, then the condemnation is 
a harmful injustice. This harm could be prevented by desisting the 
condemnation, or it could be cured by redistributing greater benefits 
to Owner, such as by paying her more than her subjective value for the 
home.118 
Moving to drunk driving, data suggests that alcohol-related 
crashes disproportionately impact recent Latino immigrants, 
particularly undocumented ones.119 Such outsized burdens on a 
 
.edu/entries/redistribution/. 
 114. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 23 (1993); Grey, supra note 113, at 880; 
Elkins, supra note 111, at 291–92. 
 115. Barry, supra note 113. 
 116. Elkins, supra note 111, at 291–92. 
 117. For example, environmental and energy law scholars have suggested that in the transition 
from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources, policies should prospectively avoid replicating 
historic inequities in allocating burdens and benefits. See, e.g., Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean 
Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 321 (2019). 
 118. Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 751, 761 (1999) 
(discussing compensation for takings of substantial segments of an injured party’s estate). 
 119. Mariana Sanchez et al., Drinking and Driving Among Recent Latino Immigrants: The 
Impact of Neighborhoods and Social Support, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1055 
(2016). 
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marginalized community represent a Rawlsian harm. In response, 
prevention policies might try to reduce disproportionate drunk driving 
in immigrant communities,120 or cure polities might allocate greater 
support services to help immigrant communities cope with higher 
rates of drunk driving. 
Finally, turning to climate change, distributive harms can arise 
both from climate change impacts and from emissions reduction 
policies. Climate change will disproportionately afflict the poor and 
vulnerable, causing displacement and hunger and risking “climate 
apartheid.”121 Recognizing this concern, the “climate justice” 
movement pursues policies both to decrease greenhouse gas emissions 
(i.e. prevent future disproportionate impacts) and to help communities 
“access[] revenue generation opportunities in the new energy 
economy” (i.e. cure entrenched inequities by reallocating 
resources).122 
However, efforts to avoid climate change can also cause 
distributive harms. For instance, emissions reduction policies can 
disproportionately impact low-income communities by raising energy 
and transportation prices.123 Some argue for preventing these 
distributive harms by leaving greenhouse gas emissions 
unregulated.124 Others suggest a cure approach like a “revenue neutral 
carbon tax,”125 which uses pricing to reduce emissions but then 
 
 120. This risks a different distributive harm of over-policing these communities. Similar 
instances of over-policing have occurred in other minority communities, and to prevent such 
distributive harms enforcement policies have been discontinued. Cf. Joseph Goldstein, Sniff Test 
Does Not Prove Public Drinking, a Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/06/15/nyregion/sniff-test-doesnt-prove-public-drinking-judge-says.html (describing a 
court’s ruling that police officer sniff tests are insufficient to establish the alcoholic content of a 
beverage consumed in public); Joe Satran, The Secret History of the War on Public Drinking, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/public-drinking-
laws_n_4312523. 
 121. World Faces ‘Climate Apartheid’ Risk, 120 More Million in Poverty: UN Expert, U.N. 
NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1041261. 
 122. NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, https://www.naacp.org/environmental-climate-justice-
about/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 123. See, e.g., NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, supra note 122. 
 124. An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, supra note 105. 
 125. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, Trump Pulled Us Out of the Paris Accord. So What’s 
the Conservative Playbook for Climate Change?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019, 12:14 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-05/post-paris-accords-conservatives-need-a-
climate-plan. 
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redistributes tax proceeds to aid those disproportionately impacted by 
the reductions.126 
B.  Scenarios Suggesting Predominant Prevention or Cure Strategies 
This section identifies particular scenarios that suggest 
predominant prevention or cure strategies, and it explores how these 
scenarios arise under positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and 
distributive justice perspectives. Specifically, it differentiates between 
readily curable harms that favor cure versus effectively incurable 
harms that call for prevention. It also considers justifiable harms that 
recommend cure and undesirable acts that suggest prevention. Finally, 
it discusses how efforts to coordinate behavior counsel prevention 
approaches. Throughout, it illustrates these scenarios with climate 
change examples. 
1.  Readily Curable Versus Effectively Incurable Harms 
One factor suggesting either predominant prevention or cure is an 
action’s consequences: whether its harms are reparable. For readily 
curable harms, a cure approach suffices, whereas effectively incurable 
harms call for prevention. 
The difference between readily curable and effectively incurable 
harms arises from the practical limitations of cure. Cure has only three 
tools to address harms: repair, replacement, and compensation. As a 
result, cure satisfyingly remedies harms to reparable interests (e.g., by 
fixing a car), replaceable interests (e.g., by providing a new car), or 
commodifiable interests (e.g., by providing the monetary value of a 
car). Such harms are readily curable,127 and avoiding them may not be 
worth the foregone behavior. 
However, interests that are not reparable, replaceable, or 
compensable128 are effectively incurable because the tools of cure 
 
 126. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: Canada, 
https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for-climate-friendly/revenue-
neutral-carbon-tax (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 127. As discussed infra Section IV.A.2.a, in such cases a liability-rule remedy and a property-
rule remedy (assuming no opportunistic inflation) should yield essentially the same result, and 
either should provide adequate compensation. 
 128. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1005–
06 (1982). 
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mismatch the harms.129 Irreparable interests cannot be repaired (e.g., 
a deceased loved one cannot be fixed), and irreplaceable interests 
cannot be replaced (e.g., a new loved one cannot be supplied). The 
only remaining cure option is compensation, but this proves clumsy 
when interests are incommensurable with money (e.g., the financial 
equivalent of a loved one).130 Thus, irreparable, irreplaceable, and 
non-commodified interests suggest predominant prevention 
strategies.131 
Positivism, utilitarianism, natural rights, and distributive justice 
offer different visions of relatively curable and effectively incurable 
harms. Under positivism, laws delineate what is curable and 
incurable.132 A contractor may remedy unpermitted construction by 
purchasing a retroactive permit (readily curable), whereas a legislature 
may not implement an unconstitutional law, even with compensation 
(effectively incurable). In the climate change context, laws that 
recognize climate harms treat them as relatively incurable and 
accordingly prioritize preventive emission reductions. For example, 
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act identifies numerous 
irreparable climate impacts133 to justify imposing 80% emission 
reductions by 2050.134 
Utilitarian commitments treat individual losses as readily curable, 
allowing them to tradeoff in cost-benefit analyses.135 However, social 
welfare losses are effectively incurable because they impoverish 
 
 129. In such cases, a liability-rule remedy and a property-rule remedy would likely diverge 
greatly, and neither may be adequate compensation. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. 
 130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
845–46 (1994) (discussing the nexus between incommensurability and property and liability rules); 
Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH 
L. REV. 683, 713–14. 
 131. See Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt, Climate Changes Property: Disaster, 
Decommodification, and Retreat, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 389 (2021) (suggesting that when markets 
have not naturally emerged for certain interests, this suggests an implicit collective calculus that 
commodifying those interests is unsuitable and undesirable); Radin, supra note 128, at 1005–06. 
 132. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 133. See Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 
(Deering 2021). 
 134. 2017 Scoping Plan Documents, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-
work/programs/ab-32-climate-change-scoping-plan/2017-scoping-plan-documents (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021). 
 135. See supra Section II.A.2. 
(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:45 PM 
1096 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1067 
 
society and shrink the production possibility frontier.136 Thus, if 
climate change causes social welfare losses, then it is an incurable 
harm that counsels prevention via emissions reductions.137 
Similarly, because natural rights perspectives consider any undue 
incursion on liberty effectively incurable, if greenhouse gas emissions 
constitute a natural rights harm, then prevention is in order.138 
Finally, while all distributive harms are theoretically curable via 
redistribution, practical limitations render some distributive harms 
effectively incurable.139 Appreciating this distinction helps navigate 
the seemingly irreconcilable distributive justice concerns with both 
climate change impacts and greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
Regressive impacts of climate change, including the displacement of 
impoverished communities, can yield subjective losses that are 
effectively incurable. Conversely, regressive monetary burdens from 
emissions limits are readily curable through financial redistribution. 
Thus, policies can simultaneously address both distributive justice 
concerns via prevention for climate impacts complemented with cure 
for disproportionate financial burdens. Plans for revenue neutral 
carbon taxes propose just such a balance.140 
2.  Justifiable Harm or Undesirable Behavior 
Another influence for preferring predominant prevention or cure 
is an action’s context: whether the action is justifiable, regardless of 
its harmful impacts, or whether it is undesirable, despite not causing 
apparent injury. Justifiable actions suggest cure, whereas undesirable 
behavior recommends prevention. 
Examples of justifiable harms include transgressions driven by 
human necessity. For instance, acts of theft to avert starvation or 
trespass to escape peril are justifiable even though they cause harms. 
While prevention of theft or trespass could ordinarily be appropriate, 
 
 136. Lesson 1: Are Disasters Good for the Economy?, FOUND. FOR TEACHING ECON., 
https://www.fte.org/teachers/teacher-resources/lesson-plans/disasterslessons/lesson-1-are-
disasters-good-for-the-economy/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 137. See Expert Report of Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 70, at 9; Rendall, supra note 73, at 445. 
 138. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 139. See supra Section II.A.4. 
 140. See supra Section IV.C.2.a. 
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in these contexts preventing the harms would endanger human life.141 
The justifiability of these acts advises a cure strategy. 
Alternately some acts may be undesirable, regardless of 
consequence. For example, drunk driving may be universally 
unwelcome, even when no one gets hurt.142 Addressing such 
“damnum absque injuria” or “negligence in the air”143 suggests 
predominant prevention. 
Again, positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive 
justice perspectives offer different ideas of justifiable and undesirable 
acts.144 To a positivist, justifiable actions and undesirable behaviors 
are simply a matter of definition. Permitted acts are, implicitly, 
justifiable, and unpermitted acts are, implicitly, undesirable. The later 
are prevented while the former are not. 
To a utilitarian, actions are justifiable, even if they cause injury, 
as long as their benefits outweigh their costs. For example, theft to 
avert starvation is justifiable because the benefits (a life saved) 
outweigh the costs (stolen food). Utilitarianism would not prevent 
such action and would consider its impacts cured by the offsetting 
social gains. Conversely, actions that cause more aggregate cost than 
benefit are undesirable, even if some instances do not cause injuries. 
Drunk driving fits this description, and utilitarian analysis supports 
preventing drunk driving to a level that avoids social welfare losses.145 
When applied to natural rights, the concepts of justifiable action 
and undesirable behavior highlight core differences between neutralist 
and legal moralist commitments. For a neutralist, the concepts are 
inapposite because no injury-causing behavior is justifiable (it 
infringes the liberty of victims), and no behavior is undesirable unless 
it causes injury (to protect the liberty of actors). For a legal moralist, 
actions can be justifiable or undesirable depending on their 
consistency with a given moral code. Actions reflecting moral 
principles are justifiable, regardless of their impacts. For example, 
healthcare providers might morally refuse to perform certain services, 
 
 141. Though society may wish to prevent such circumstances from arising in the first place. 
 142. Cf., e.g., Fennell, supra note 95, at 1408 (explaining that self-help measures may be taken 
to avoid factory pollution even in the absence of any harmful result). 
 143. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920). 
 144. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 145. See discussion supra Section II.A.2. 
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regardless of consequences for patients.146 Alternatively, legal 
moralists might find some behavior, such as buying alcohol on 
Sundays, fundamentally undesirable and prevent it regardless of its 
consequences.147 
Finally, analysis of justifiability or undesirability adds little to 
distributive justice inquiries, which already incorporate contextual 
evaluations. From a distributive perspective, justifiable actions are the 
same as non-harmful actions; they facilitate a desired distributional 
outcome. Similarly, undesirable actions are the same as harmful 
actions; they thwart desired distributions.148 
Returning to climate change, the link between justifiable actions 
and cure helps explain policies, like the Trump Administration’s 
Affordable Clean Energy Rule,149 that minimally restrict greenhouse 
gas emissions.150 Such policies implicitly (or explicitly) reason that 
emissions are so socially and economically important that they are 
worth potential climate harms. Because they consider emissions 
justifiable,151 these policies disfavor prevention (i.e., deprioritize 
emission reductions) and preference cure (i.e., react to climate impacts 
that arise).152 
3.  Coordination 
Finally, efforts to coordinate behavior call for predominant 
prevention strategies. While most policies try to influence behavior, 
sometimes coordination itself becomes a central aim. For instance, 
coordinated behavior can provide a solution for “prisoners’ dilemma” 
 
 146. Cf. Conscience Protections for Health Care Providers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-protections/index.html (last updated Mar. 22, 
2018) (detailing several protections for health care providers who are unwilling to perform 
abortions). 
 147. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 148. See supra Section II.A.4. 
 149. Affordable Clean Energy Rule, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov 
/stationary-sources-air-pollution/affordable-clean-energy-rule (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 150. See Burtraw & Keyes, supra note 75 (describing the limited emissions reductions of the 
rule). 
 151. Few would suggest that greenhouse gas emissions are inherently undesirable regardless of 
their impacts. Indeed, all living beings emit greenhouse gasses. Cf. Shashkevich, supra note 103 
(discussing the balancing of benefits and trade-offs in fields relevant to climate change). 
 152. As discussed infra Section IV.A.1.c., this may be limited to external cure through disaster 
assistance or even letting losses fall where they may. 
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and “tragedy of the commons” problems.153 Additionally, 
“coordination games” model situations where coordinated activity 
produces the best outcome. A common example is the “driving game.” 
It describes two drivers approaching each other from opposite 
directions on a narrow road. To avoid colliding, both drivers must 
swerve to the side, and swerving left or right are equally appealing. 
Here, the most important factor is that the drivers coordinate. Whether 
they swerve left or right is immaterial; that they choose in a concerted 
fashion (both to their left or both to their right) determines whether 
they pass safely. In scenarios like these, coordination itself is a core 
objective, and legal contexts ranging from contract doctrines to 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence place a premium on coordination.154 
Prevention offers clearer information to facilitate coordination 
than does cure.155 Revisiting the driving game, a prevention approach, 
such as a sign directing traffic, fosters easy coordination. Cure cannot 
harmonize behavior so directly. While drivers could decide how to 
swerve based on information from past collisions,156 that would be 
costlier and less consistent than a preventive approach.157 
Promoting coordination via prevention is consistent with 
positivism and utilitarianism. Innumerable positive laws, such as 
traffic regulations, coordinate through prevention. Additionally, using 
prevention to lower coordination costs has utilitarian appeal. Natural 
rights perspectives also accommodate coordinative prevention, as long 
as it does not infringe liberty. Neutralists would accept coordination 
to avoid harms, and legal moralists adopt coordination to promote 
morals. Finally, distributive justice can embrace prevention to 
coordinate preferred distributive outcomes.158 
 
 153. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 154. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 447, 451–52 (2020). 
 155. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 76. 
 156. This would involve using information about cure to inform private precaution. 
 157. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 72, 76 (“The great benefit of regulation is that every party 
covered by the regulation does not incur information costs. In contrast, the tort system imposes 
information costs for every case.”). Cf. Shavell, supra note 8, at 358–71 (juxtaposing activities 
controlled mainly by liability and activities subject to significant preventative regulation); George, 
supra note 5, at 186–87 (illustrating the need for a preventative measure, namely government 
regulation, to maintain highway traffic safety). 
 158. See supra Section II.A. 
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Turning again to climate change, coordination challenges have 
hampered international emission-reduction efforts, but the Paris 
Agreement demonstrates how a prevention policy can help overcome 
coordination barriers. Prior to 2016, the United States and other 
nations hesitated to reduce emissions without a shared global 
commitment.159 In 2016, the Paris Agreement invited such 
international cooperation through a treaty to prevent global 
temperatures from exceeding a stated level.160 To date 191 nations 
have joined the Agreement,161 and its shared prevention goal has been 
instrumental for nations to coordinate their emission reductions. 
III.  IMPERFECTIONS IN APPLIED PREVENTION AND CURE 
The previous Part considered how prevention and cure 
conceptually fit with different normative values and factual scenarios. 
This Part addresses the practical limitations of applied prevention and 
cure approaches. 
In theory, prevention could precisely avoid harms without undue 
constraints. And, in theory, actors could effectually cure all harms they 
cause. However, practical applications of prevention and cure will 
almost certainly be flawed. They may be over-inclusive or under-
inclusive (and sometimes may actually be both).162 This Part explores 
the imperfections likely to arise in applied prevention and cure, and it 
considers how they impact positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and 
 
 159. See History of UN Climate Talks, CTR. CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
https://www.c2es.org/content/history-of-un-climate-talks/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 160. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021). 
 161. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement—Status of 
Ratification, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021). The Trump Administration formally withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement 
in 2020 based on its disagreement with the substance of the emission reduction commitments. See 
Frank Jordans & Seth Borenstein, US Formally Exits Paris Pact Aiming to Curb Climate Change, 
AP NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/us-leaves-paris-agreement-climate-change-
1331bc30021756454dda8eb7ff3c1075; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-
from-the-paris-agreement/index.html. The U.S. has since rejoined the Paris Agreement under the 
Biden Administration. See Statement, White House, Paris Climate Agreement (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-
agreement/. No other countries have attempted to withdraw. 
 162. Prevention may be both over- and under-inclusive if it both over-constrains behavior and 
still does not adequately avoid harm. Cure may be both over- and under-inclusive by imposing too 
much liability on some parties and too little on others. 
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distributive justice commitments. It also offers examples of how these 
imperfections manifest in the climate change context. 
A.  Over-inclusive and Under-inclusive Prevention 
Prevention measures may be either over-inclusive, constraining 
too much behavior, or under-inclusive, permitting too many harms. 
Knowledge limitations and political pressures contribute to both over- 
and under-inclusion. Additionally, uncertainties, transaction costs, 
under-protections, and under-compensation can cause over-inclusive 
prevention. 
1.  Knowledge Limitations 
To avoid harms, prevention measures must anticipate when and 
how harms will arise. Such predictions may be informed, but they 
cannot be certain. Thus, knowledge limitations pose an inherent 
challenge for prevention regimes.163 Sometimes a lack of knowledge 
begets over-inclusive prevention, whether intentionally prophylactic 
or simply misestimated. In other cases, knowledge limitations may 
cause under-inclusive prevention due to misunderstood risks or 
unforeseen harms. 
These knowledge limitations frustrate utilitarian efforts to predict 
the costs and benefits of prevention measures. Additionally, because 
knowledge limitations cause ill tailoring of prevention regimes, they 
raise natural rights concerns about infringement on the liberty of 
victims (with under-inclusion) or actors (with over-inclusion). 
Knowledge limitations loom large for climate change policies. 
Beyond the scientific consensus that human-induced climate change 
is occurring,164 high uncertainty shrouds nearly every prediction of 
climate change impacts and timing.165 Most environmentalists believe 
these knowledge limitations have resulted in under-inclusive efforts to 
prevent climate change, whereas opponents of greenhouse gas 
 
 163. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722–23 (explaining that a problem with liability 
rules is that the behavior of parties prior to takings must be considered); Viscusi, supra note 42, at 
87 (concluding that even workers’ compensation, which passes benefits to claimants with very little 
distortion, does not create efficient risk-reduction incentives). 
 164. Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NASA GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2021). 
 165. See, e.g., Matt Simon, Climate Change Is Very Real. But So Much of It Is Uncertain, 
WIRED (July 17, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/climate-change-is-very-real-but-
so-much-of-it-is-uncertain/. 
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regulation worry that knowledge limitations have created over-
inclusive prevention.166 
2.  Political Pressures 
Political pressures can also cause over- or under-inclusion in 
government-imposed prevention measures.167 Prevention efforts can 
generate concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, making them a target 
for interest groups who lobby to capture benefits while spreading 
burdens. 
This can drive over-inclusive prevention. For instance, interest 
group pressures might produce unwarranted licensure requirements or 
environmental regulations that claim to prevent harms but actually just 
restrict competition.168 Alternately, political pressures can cause 
under-inclusive prevention. For example, interest-group influence can 
hollow environmental protections, ossify outdated regulations,169 or 
secure carve-outs for favored industries.170 
These political pressures can undermine positivist commitments 
by compromising the lawmaking process, and they can subvert 
utilitarian principles by promoting inefficient policies. Further, 
interest group influence raises distributive justice concerns. If 
powerful actors can advantageously shape or navigate prevention 
measures, they enrich themselves at the expense of the less 
fortunate.171 
 
 166. See, e.g., id. 
 167. External prevention is not necessarily hopelessly subject to these influences. For example, 
some commentators suggest that competing interest groups may check each other. See, e.g., JAMES 
RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 5 (3d ed. 2016). Others suggest that 
spreading regulatory authority over multiple public institutions helps avoid concentrated influence. 
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1599–1600 (2007). 
 168. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1495, 1515 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the 
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 508 (1988). 
 169. See Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, 15 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 119, 120, 123 (2007); Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between 
Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 
4. 
 170. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy, 63 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1187, 1210 (2013). 
 171. Cf. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 125 (explaining that different law is 
aimed at controlling the behavior of rich and poor injurers). 
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Climate change policies evidence such political pressures. In 
particular, powerful fossil fuel and energy industries have lobbied 
heavily to curb emission-reduction measures,172 arguably leading to 
under-inclusive prevention of climate change.173 
3.  Uncertainty, Transaction Costs, Under-protection and Under-
compensation 
Private actors may adopt internal prevention measures174 to avoid 
costs,175 and such incentive-based prevention can be efficient and 
well-tailored. However, uncertainties, transaction costs, under-
protections, and under-compensation incentivize over-inclusive 
internal prevention, which can foreclose desirable actions and gainful 
trades.176 
For instance, uncertainty over liabilities and the transaction costs 
of gaining certainty can lead parties to forego beneficial behavior. As 
an illustration, recall the example of efficient breach: Actor contracts 
with Victim to supply a product worth $100 to Victim (i.e., expectancy 
damages are $100), but then Better Price offers to buy Actor’s product 
for $210. If Actor is confident that she will owe only expectancy 
damages, then Actor should breach, pay Victim expectancy damages 
of $100, sell to Better Price for $210, and end up with $110. Given 
certainty about her liability, Actor has little incentive to exercise 
private prevention and avoid the breach. However, if Actor is unsure 
whether her damages will exceed $110, she may exercise prevention 
and avoid the breach, even if it would have ultimately been 
worthwhile.177 
As the example shows, if a party faces uncertain liability or 
transaction costs, she may adopt over-inclusive prevention and forego 
otherwise beneficial behavior. This is a variation on Ronald Coase’s 
 
 172. Fossil Fuel Interests Have Outspent Environmental Advocates 10:1 on Climate Lobbying, 
YALE ENV’T 360 (July 19, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/fossil-fuel-interests-have-outspent-
environmental-advocates-101-on-climate-lobbying. 
 173. Though opponents of climate regulation argue the opposite: that environmentalist political 
influence has led to over-inclusive prevention of emissions. 
 174. See infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing internal prevention). 
 175. See supra Section I.C. 
 176. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960) 
(explaining how actions of firms may have harmful effects on others). 
 177. Cf. Shavell, supra note 31, at 6 & n.16 (introducing the same concept as it relates to goods 
and property sales). 
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insight that individuals will not make otherwise gainful trades if 
transaction costs outweigh the benefits of the trade.178 Similarly, 
actors will not take otherwise gainful actions (i.e., will exercise over-
inclusive prevention) if the uncertainties and transaction costs 
outweigh the potential gains. 
Payments to “patent trolls”179 further illustrate how legal 
uncertainties and transaction costs induce over-inclusive private 
prevention. Patent trolls typically acquire patents to threaten 
infringement suits against companies.180 In doing so, patent trolls bet 
that companies will pay for a license, even if the patent claim is 
questionable, because that would be cheaper than litigating the 
patent’s validity.181 Thus, patent trolls expect companies to employ 
over-inclusive internal prevention (in the form of purchasing licenses) 
because of legal uncertainties and transaction costs.182 If the patent’s 
invalidity were certain or litigation costs were low, companies might 
proceed despite the patent troll’s threat, but the high uncertainty and 
transaction costs frequently lead companies to deploy over-inclusive 
prevention by paying trolls.183 
Private parties may also employ over-inclusive prevention if they 
believe that their interests will be under-protected or their losses will 
be under-compensated.184 For instance, if property rights are ill-
enforced, then property holders will likely undertake excessive 
precautions (like special locks or private security) to guard against 
harms.185 Such over-inclusive prevention comes at the opportunity 
cost of more desirable pursuits. Similarly, if bicyclists are 
 
 178. See Coase, supra note 176, at 15–19. 
 179. “Patent troll” is a derogatory term for an entity that uses a patent for profit via licensing or 
litigation rather than for innovation or production. See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., The Patent 
Troll: Benign Middleman or Stick-Up Artist? 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 25713, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25713. More derogatory still, some label “patent 
trolls” as “stick-up artists.” See id. at 3. 
 180. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991, 2008 (2007). 
 181. Id. at 2009. 
 182. Id. at 2008–10. 
 183. Id. 
 184. This correlates with under-inclusive cure, discussed infra Section III.B.1. 
 185. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722; see also Henry E. Smith, Property and 
Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1730 (2004) (explaining how high-valuing property 
owners can “opt-out” of the legal system with self-protection measures). 
(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/21  12:45 PM 
2021] PREVENTION AND CURE 1105 
 
systematically under-compensated in automotive collisions, fewer 
people are likely to bicycle, even if they would like to. 
Some climate change responses reflect over-inclusive private 
prevention due to uncertainty. For instance, some parties have begun 
hoarding resources to buffer unknown climate risks, and these actions 
are likely both over-protective and socially damaging.186 
B.  Over-inclusive and Under-inclusive Cure 
Like prevention, cure too can be over- and under-inclusive. 
Under-inclusive cure allows actors to externalize costs and neglects to 
make victims whole. Over-inclusive cure imposes disproportionate 
costs on actors and undermines victims’ incentives for precaution. 
1.  Under-inclusive Cure 
Cure measures are under-inclusive when they allow actors to 
externalize costs onto victims. By allowing actors to retain their 
actions’ benefits but offload their costs, under-inclusive cure both 
under-compensates victims187 and creates perverse incentives for 
actors. 
Some cure measures are intentionally under-inclusive and 
externalize costs by design. Most obviously, tort immunity doctrines 
free some actors of cure obligations. Doctrines limiting the scope of 
liability, such as the negligence concept of proximate cause, also 
purposefully cabin cure duties.188 Similarly, bankruptcy doctrines that 
discharge debts and other instances of judgment-proof actors occasion 
under-inclusive cure.189 Finally, some damages doctrines, like 
statutory damage caps or rules limiting non-economic damages,190 
expressly limit cure by externalizing some (sometimes all) costs of 
action.191 
 
 186. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Triage: A Resources Trust to Address Inequality in a Climate-
Changed World, 50 ENVTL. L. 97, 107–08 (2020). 
 187. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 96–97. 
 188. See, e.g., HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., LAW OF TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 281–329 
(6th ed. 2015). For example, a train that causes a major fire may be liable for damages to a structure 
adjacent to the track but not to additional neighboring ones. See id. 
 189. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 721; De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, 
at 121; cf. F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1418–19 (1986) 
(explaining how limited liability may distort incentives to take preventative measures). 
 190. See, e.g., SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 188; STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32. 
 191. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 746 (illustrating the concept through the example 
of a property owner who has an entitlement to burn leaves at the cost of his neighbors). 
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Other doctrines default to under-inclusive cure by forcing victims 
to overcome barriers to recovery. For example, placing burdens of 
proof on plaintiffs sets a presumption of under-inclusive cure by 
denying remedies in close cases.192 
While these examples may represent calculated policies to 
subsidize particular actors, they nonetheless embody under-inclusive 
cure because they force victims to bear externalized costs. This raises 
positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice concerns. 
For example, measures that allow actors to retain benefits but spread 
costs create suspicion of rent seeking and interest group influence, 
potentially challenging positivist legitimacy.193 Additionally, 
externalized costs grate against utilitarian analysis and create 
incentives that can amplify social welfare losses.194 Under-inclusive 
cure encourages actors to continue harmful conduct without optimal 
precaution195 and victims to adopt over-inclusive prevention 
measures.196 This also ignores natural rights commitments by 
stripping protection of victims’ autonomy,197 and it likely has 
regressive distributive impacts because those least able to protect 
themselves will bear more externalized costs.198 
Regarding climate change, the consistent failure of climate-based 
tort claims provides an overarching example of under-inclusive 
cure.199 The doctrinal hurdles in tort law have allowed the parties most 
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions to externalize essentially all 
remedial costs.200 
 
 192. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 69. 
 193. Cf. Yotam Kaplan, In Defense of Compensation, 70 ALA. L. REV. 573, 604 (2018) (using 
the example of a home security system to illustrate this point). 
 194. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 8, at 359–71. 
 195. See discussion of the model of precaution and the interplay between prevention and cure, 
supra Part I. See also De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 140 (noting that there is no 
general regulatory standard prompting injurers to take the best level of precaution). 
 196. See supra Section III.A. 
 197. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 326 (1992). 
 198. See Kaplan, supra note 193, at 575–76. 
 199. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T 
L. 1, 2–44 (2011) (discussing obstacles in climate change litigation and the subsequent lack of 
satisfactory remedy). 
 200. Id. 
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2.  Over-inclusive Cure 
Cure may be over-inclusive in two regards: how much is paid and 
who pays. First, over-inclusive cure can describe excessive liability 
that obligates actors to overcompensate for harms. Second, over-
inclusive cure can describe overbroad remedial duties or gratuitous 
care. In either case, over-inclusive cure yields problematic incentives. 
Overcompensation requirements raise the costs of activity and 
may induce actors to decrease desirable behavior (resulting in over-
inclusive internal prevention).201 For instance, some argue that 
medical malpractice liability is excessive and that it increases costs, 
depresses access, and lowers quality of healthcare.202 Commentators 
also suggest that products liability damages for asbestos are inordinate 
and produce undesirable results.203 Additionally, overcompensation 
can incentivize potential victims to neglect their own precautions, 
causing under-inclusive internal prevention.204 
Over-inclusive cure can also involve overbroad liability 
spreading or gratuitous care. Unlike overcompensation, which saddles 
injury-causing actors with too much cost, overbroad liability 
spreading can impose too little cost on injury-causing actors, allowing 
them to externalize burdens for harms they produce. Such over-
inclusive cure can arise if an entire industry or the public at large foots 
the bill for a privately caused harm.205 Gratuitous care has similar 
effects. For instance, if a third party, such as a doctor in the family, 
treats injuries at no cost to the victim or, importantly, to the actor,206 
then the actor has externalized the costs of the injury.207 
Policies may intentionally embrace over-inclusive cure to ensure 
that victims have recourse for harms, and allocating resources to 
protect victims potentially advances distributive justice principles. 
 
 201. See infra Section IV.A.1.a (discussion of internal prevention). 
 202. See Medical Malpractice Litigation Raises Health Care Cost, Reduces Access and Lowers 
Quality of Care, EMP. POL’Y FOUND. (June 19, 2003), https://www.heartland.org/_template-
assets/documents/publications/14736.pdf. 
 203. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 99–100. 
 204. See infra Part IV. 
 205. There is an important distinction between this liability spreading, which externalizes costs, 
and the passing of costs to consumers, which internalizes harm. 
 206. See SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 188, at 291. 
 207. The same result can arise from any positive externalities. For instance, unpriced ecosystem 
services can sometimes effectively neutralize private parties’ pollution, allowing the polluter to 
avoid bearing those pollution costs. See NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON 
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 266–68 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). 
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However, positivist, utilitarian, and natural rights worries may persist. 
Both overcompensation and liability spreading ply government 
policies to concentrate benefits, so they may implicate positivist 
concerns with interest-group influence and rent seeking.208 Further, 
utilitarians may fear that over-inclusive cure distorts costs and benefits 
to the point of social welfare losses.209 Finally, requirements of 
overcompensation or liability spreading threaten the natural rights 
liberty of actors by imposing undue obligations.210 
Climate change offers numerous examples of over-inclusive cure 
via overbroad liability spreading. To take a global instance, the costs 
of greenhouse gas emissions are borne globally, even though a small 
group of nations contribute the great majority of these emissions.211 
Because these costs, as well as any remedial efforts, are distributed 
disproportionately to causation, climate change imposes over-
inclusive cure. 
IV.  INTEGRATED PREVENTION AND CURE STRATEGIES 
This Part explores how integrated strategies of prevention and 
cure can mitigate over- and under-inclusion concerns and advance 
various positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice 
commitments. To build a foundation for discussing these integrated 
strategies, Section A first analyzes major variations of prevention and 
cure and illustrates how these variations fit together to shape 
individual prevention and cure measures. Then, Section B details how 
particular complementary prevention and cure measures can combine 
symbiotically to advance policy goals. Finally, Section C examines 
how a suite of prevention and cure measures can assemble into 
interconnected policy landscapes, and it applies these insights to 
explain and critique policy structures addressing motorist behavior 
and climate change. In particular, it uncovers how current climate 
policy suffers because of disjointed prevention and cure measures, and 
it suggests how expanding particular cure variations can reinforce 
climate policy efforts. 
 
 208. See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
 209. See discussion infra Section II.A.2. 
 210. See discussion infra Section II.A.3. 
 211. See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions. 
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A.  Major Variations of Prevention and Cure 
This section explores four important variations of prevention and 
cure: (1) external or internal, (2) property-rule or liability-rule, (3) ex-
ante or ex-post, and (4) actor-presumptive or victim-presumptive. It 
illustrates each of these variations through climate change examples. 
Before engaging these variations in detail, Figure 1 offers a visual 
overview to demonstrate how the variations fit together within the 
prevention and cure framework. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the analysis begins by identifying a harm 
(top row in figure) and adopting either a prevention or cure approach 
to address that harm (second row). Then both prevention and cure 
approaches offer possible variations. Both prevention and cure can be 
either internal or external (third row), liability-rule or property-rule 
(fourth row),212 ex-ante or ex-post (fifth row), and actor-presumptive 
or victim-presumptive (sixth row).213 
This set of variations is cumulative, meaning that any applied 
instance of prevention or cure reflects a set of choices about each 
variation. Accordingly, Figure 1 presents the variations as a flowchart 
to depict how the ultimate result of all variation choices (seventh row, 
left blank) describes an individual policy measure for addressing a 
harm. 
As subsequent sections discuss, these individual policy measures 
(which ultimately populate the seventh row, and which Section IV.C 
will illustrate with examples regarding motorist behavior and climate 
change) can combine into integrated policy landscapes. For now, 
Section A builds the foundation for later sections by detailing the 
particular variations underlying individual prevention and cure 
measures. 
1.  External or Internal 
Prevention and cure may be either external or internal. For 
prevention, the distinction between external and internal turns on the 
entity imposing the precaution, whereas the difference between 
external and internal cure turns on the entity supplying the remedy. 
a.  External or internal prevention 
Efforts to prevent harm may come from external or internal 
sources. External prevention measures rely on governmental authority 
to limit or compel certain actions, and prescriptive regulations are the 
quintessential example. For instance, a stop sign is an external 
prevention measure to avoid the harm of auto accidents. External 
prevention also includes legal limits on governmental powers, such as 
 
 212. As discussed infra Section IV.A.2, the property-rule versus liability-rule distinction is not 
applicable to internal prevention. 
 213. As discussed infra Section IV.A.4, the actor presumption versus victim presumption is 
also not applicable to internal prevention. 
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constitutional provisions proscribing certain government actions.214 
The unifying feature of external prevention measures is that the force 
of law directly dictates actions. 
Conversely, internal prevention measures are essentially self-
regulation; they involve actors’ self-directed efforts to avoid harms. 
These measures are not mandated by law, but they often arise in 
reaction to incentives created by legal obligations.215 For example, 
internal prevention frequently aims to cost-effectively avert legal 
liabilities, either by obviating the causes of harm or by staving off 
victims’ realization of harm. 
To avoid the causes of harm, parties can undertake precautions. 
For example, manufacturers might sua sponte include warning labels 
or physical guards on potentially dangerous products. Parties may also 
avoid causing harm by desisting activities. For example, a 
manufacturer may discontinue producing a dangerous product. 
Alternatively, actors may forestall victims’ realization of harm by 
preemptively acquiring legal entitlements to avoid infringing upon 
them.216 This reflects internal prevention through consolidation. For 
example, a noisy factory might purchase surrounding properties to 
avoid nuisance liabilities. Such consolidation does not change the 
harm-causing activity; the factory remains noisy. Rather, it removes 
would-be victims from the position to realize harm. Thus, 
consolidation measures attempt to, quite literally, internalize 
impacts.217 
 
 214. For example, constitutional amendments beginning “nor shall congress . . .” or “no state 
shall . . . .” See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 215. See supra Part III. Internal prevention can also arise in response to numerous other 
motivations. For example, neighborly norms may lead to individuals not undertaking noisy actions, 
such as mowing lawns, before 10:00 AM, even if the actions would trigger no liability. Internal 
prevention may also seek to avoid other costs, such as client or employee dissatisfaction, fluctuation 
in revenues or input prices, or transaction costs. See supra Part III. 
 216. See Coase, supra note 176, at 8–15; cf. Fennell, supra note 95, at 1458 (explaining that 
explicit government-sanctioned options, such as purchasing a license or paying a tax, allow parties 
to gauge benefits of engaging in an activity). 
 217. In some instances, courts disfavor, and sometimes invalidate, attempts to use consolidation 
as an internal prevention strategy. For example, courts have frequently invalidated attempts by 
doctors to secure exculpatory clauses for medical malpractice. See, e.g., Matthew J.B. Lawrence, 
Note, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement: Introducing 
Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 850, 854 (2009). 
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Regardless of whether internal prevention measures address the 
causes or realization of harms, they share one unifying feature: self-
imposition. 
Internal and external prevention measures are not necessarily 
exclusive. In fact, parties often adopt internal prevention on top of 
external prevention, particularly when regulatory compliance does not 
guarantee freedom from liability.218 For example, some municipal 
regulations (external prevention) merely require shoveling snow from 
a sidewalk within eight hours of daylight,219 but individuals may still 
preemptively salt sidewalks or clear snow earlier (internal prevention) 
to avoid potential negligence liability. 
Indeed, some policies use external prevention to induce internal 
prevention. For instance, environmental cap-and-trade policies 
mandate maximum pollution levels (external prevention) but then 
allow trading of pollution entitlements, expecting that some firms will 
voluntarily reduce pollution (internal prevention) to sell their 
entitlements.220 Thus, external and internal prevention can be mutually 
reinforcing.221 
However, in other situations, external and internal prevention 
may tradeoff against each other, at least at the margins. For instance, 
internal prevention efforts can displace external prevention. This can 
be desirable; private actions may reduce harms enough to obviate 
public regulation. However, if private efforts are fleeting or ineffective 
or if they come at the expense of public values, transparency, and 
procedural safeguards,222 then internal displacement of external 
prevention becomes disquieting. 
Conversely, external prevention may also displace internal 
precautions, which can produce perverse incentives. For example, the 
“Peltzman effect” hypothesis suggests that individuals react to public 
 
 218. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 371; De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 120. 
 219. See, e.g., D.C. DIST. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DO THE RIGHT THING! CLEAR YOUR 
SIDEWALKS, https://ddot.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddot/page_content/attachments/Sidewa
lk%20Snow%20Clearing%20Responsibilities%20-%20Residents%20and%20Private%20Propert 
y%20Owners.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 220. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 77–78. 
 221. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 125. 
 222. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1290 (2003); Dave Owen, Consultants, the Environment, and the Law, 61 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 823, 824–25 (2019); Joshua Ulan Galperin, Foreword, Private, Environmental, Governance, 
9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 1, 2 (2018). 
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precautions, like car safety regulations, by reducing private 
precautions, like safe driving.223 Along similar lines, some argue that 
federal policies to prevent wildfires and floods lead individuals to 
undertake riskier development in hazardous areas.224 Thus, external 
prevention can erode internal prevention and create moral hazards. 
Whether operating as complements or substitutes, internal and 
external prevention have relative strengths and weaknesses, 
particularly for addressing knowledge limitations and residual risk. 
For instance, while knowledge limitations beset all prevention 
measures, external or internal prevention can offer relative knowledge 
advantages for avoiding certain harms. Internal prevention provides 
knowledge advantages for highly contextual harm avoidance, whereas 
external prevention may better address acontextual risks. As Steven 
Shavell has argued, when avoiding harm depends on contextual 
details, private actors can possess superior knowledge.225 Shavell 
offers the example of an individual cutting down a tree near a 
neighbor’s house.226 Since the individual can appreciate the precise 
size and location of the tree, she can tailor precautions more 
effectively than a public regulator might.227 Conversely, when harm 
avoidance depends on more general, acontextual information, public 
regulators can have knowledge advantages. Shavell poses the example 
of a small fumigation company that applies pesticides without fully 
understanding their chemistry.228 In this instance, the risk of harm 
depends more on the pesticide than on the immediate factual context, 
and the public regulator may possess superior knowledge about the 
chemicals’ risks.229 
External prevention can also offer advantages for lowering 
residual risks. Though no prevention measure can completely 
eliminate risk, external prevention can reduce residual risk more 
 
 223. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 
(1975). 
 224. See Alison Berry, Forest Policy Up in Smoke: Fire Suppression in the United States, PROP. 
& ENV’T RSCH. CTR., https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/Forest_Policy_Up_in 
_Smoke.pdf. 
 225. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 366. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 369. 
 229. See id. at 359–60, 369; see also Viscusi, supra note 42, at 76 (explaining the general 
benefits of governmental regulation based on governmental knowledge). 
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directly, predictably, and extensively than can internal prevention. 
Because internal prevention is individual and largely incentive-based, 
policy efforts can only indirectly influence internal prevention, such 
as by changing incentive structures. Additionally, individuals are 
unlikely to adopt more precaution than they find individually cost-
effective. However, external prevention can directly impose 
precautions to reduce residual risk, and it can calibrate precautions 
based on values other than cost-effectiveness. For example, external 
prevention can maximize saving lives rather than economic efficiency 
by imposing more protective precautions than would be cost-effective 
for some individuals.230 
A hypothetical helps illustrate these points: Imagine a dangerous 
industry, where if negligence leads to a fatality, a firm’s total expected 
cost231 is $2 million per fatality. Through cost-effective precautions, a 
firm can avoid all but two fatalities per year. Finally, precautions to 
reduce yearly fatalities from two to one would cost an additional $3 
million per year. 
Under these facts, the two yearly fatalities represent residual risk 
that cannot be avoided by cost-effective precautions. To reduce 
fatalities from two to one would cost more ($3 million) than a firm 
would save ($2 million at most),232 so firms have no financial 
incentive to lower this risk. 
If policymakers seek to lower annual fatalities from two to one 
(i.e., reduce residual risk), external prevention can directly pursue this 
goal. Policies could require the necessary precautions to reduce 
fatalities, or they could mandate that firms cease operating if they 
cause more than one yearly fatality. Under the given facts, such 
measures would plainly require firms to take more precaution than 
their individual incentives would otherwise direct (i.e., spending $3 
million to save $2 million, or ceasing operation). However, the 
regulation would predictably advance the policymakers’ goal of 
decreasing fatalities. 
 
 230. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 42, at 89; Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 245–47. 
 231. Inclusive of liability and all other relevant costs. 
 232. Under the negligence standard, the firm may be acting reasonably by taking precautions 
that avoid all but two yearly fatalities. If so, the firm would not actually be liable for the two yearly 
fatalities, meaning that additional precautions would not actually avoid any costs. However, if the 
firm were found to negligently violate the duty of reasonable care, it would face $2 million for the 
fatality. 
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Conversely, policies attempting to lower fatalities through 
internal prevention would be indirect and unpredictable. Policymakers 
might try to raise the cost of fatalities, say to $4 million per fatality, 
but the path for doing so is murky because policies may not be able to 
increase negligence damage awards in a predictable and targeted way. 
To influence internal prevention would require circuitous efforts to 
adjust liability (i.e., cure) without certain results. 
Obviously, this hypothetical presents a stylized scenario, but it 
illustrates how external prevention offers advantages for reducing 
residual risk. 
b.  External or internal cure 
Cure can also be external or internal, depending on the party that 
supplies the remedy. Internal cure regimes require the harm-causing233 
actor to provide a remedy, thereby internalizing cure obligations. 
External cure regimes place cure burdens on entities other than the 
harm-causing actor. 
Examples of internal cure are familiar. Tort doctrines follow this 
approach, at least nominally.234 Additionally, regulatory takings and 
eminent domain reflect internal cure approaches because the harm-
causing actor, even if a government entity, bears remedial liabilities 
internally.235 
External cure arises anytime harm burdens fall on entities other 
than the harm-causing actor. This includes burdens on groups, the 
general public, or victims themselves. For example, social insurance 
programs, like the worker’s compensation program, the social security 
disabilities program, and the National Flood Insurance program, create 
external cure structures because remedies come from groups that did 
not cause the harms at issue.236 Further, doctrines that recognize 
immunities or limit damages impose external cure by spreading cure 
burdens to victims rather than harm-causing actors. Similarly, policies 
 
 233. A Coasian view might object to this normative use of the term causation. See generally 
Coase, supra note 176, at 2 (discussing reciprocal causation). However, this use of the term assumes 
that entitlements are already determined. 
 234. If tort regimes systematically allow for externalized costs of harm, they become de facto 
external cure regimes. 
 235. However, to the extent these doctrines externalize subjective losses, they can be seen as 
engaging some external cure. 
 236. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 17–18; Viscusi, supra note 42, at 70. 
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that fully externalize costs onto victims—for example, by letting 
harms fall where they may—represent external cure approaches. 
Internal cure comports with ideas of market discipline and, 
possibly, justice. By forcing actors to internalize their costs, it sends 
market signals about desirable behavior. Alternatively, external cure 
undercuts market discipline in service of other goals like subsidizing 
actions and, in the case of social insurance, ensuring compensation for 
victims.237 
Policies can choose between internal and external cure 
approaches, or they can combine them as alternative remedies. For 
example, adopting internal cure along with external cure (in the form 
of social insurance) in reserve can protect victims from judgement-
proof defendants. Some environmental laws take such an approach, 
holding responsible parties liable for pollution but also providing 
public funds as a backstop for environmental cleanup.238 
c.  Graphical depiction and application to climate change 
Figure 2 summarizes internal and external variations on 
prevention and cure. 
  
 
 237. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 66. 
 238. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2018). 
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Figure 2: Internal and External Prevention and Cure 
 Internal External 
Prevention Actors’ self-directed precaution 
Government-imposed 
regulation 
Cure Harm-causing actor has remedial obligation  
An entity other than the harm-
causing actor (a group, the 
general public, or the victim 
herself) bears the harm burden 
The following climate change examples showcase internal and 
external variations on prevention and cure. 
On the prevention side, external prevention measures include 
government regulations aimed at mitigating climate change effects by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, California’s Global 
Warming Solutions Act requires 80% emission reductions by 2050.239 
Alternately, internal prevention measures entail voluntary efforts to 
mitigate climate change impacts. Such internal prevention can occur 
at small scales—for example, when individuals try to reduce their 
carbon footprints—or at large scales, such as when corporations elect 
to limit their emissions through “private environmental 
governance.”240 
As for cure, internal cure would involve liability for climate 
change harms in proportion to contribution to climate change. While 
some tort suits have pursued such internal cure—for example, by 
alleging that major greenhouse gas emitters are liable for climate-
exacerbated hurricane damages241—all such attempts have been 
unsuccessful.242 At the present, no legislation or judicial decision has 
imposed liability proportionate to climate change causation, so there 
are no examples of actual internal cure for climate change harms. 
Rather, in the context of climate change, all cure practice has been 
 
 239. 2017 Scoping Plan Documents, supra note 134. 
 240. See Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 
(2013). 
 241. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 242. See, e.g., id. at 1055. 
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external, meaning that the costs of climate change harms have fallen 
disproportionately to greenhouse gas emissions. Such external cure 
has come in the form of social insurance—for example, via disaster 
assistance programs that alleviate burdens of climate-exacerbated 
storms or floods. Additionally, external cure has entailed individual 
victims bearing their own costs of climate impacts, for example by 
expending their own funds to rebuild or relocate after climate-induced 
storms or floods. 
Figure 3 summarizes these climate change examples of internal 
and external prevention and cure. 
Figure 3: Examples of Internal and External Prevention and Cure 
 Internal External 
Prevention Voluntary reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
Government-imposed 
reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Cure 
Major greenhouse gas 
emitters are liable for 
climate change harms 
Disaster assistance programs 
or victims pay for climate 
change harms 
2.  Property Rule or Liability Rule 
Another important variation for prevention and cure is whether 
they employ property rules or liability rules. Liability rules impose 
relatively objective prices, often linked to market prices, whereas 
property rules impose relatively subjective prices, which can exceed 
market prices and theoretically approach the infinite.243 Prevention 
can regulate behavior through either property rules or liability rules, 
and cure can offer either property-rule or liability-rule remedies. 
 
 243. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 756–57 (observing property rules and liability rules 
as a continuum from zero to infinitely high damages); see also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the 
Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. REV. 1169, 1175–77 (2013) 
(summarizing scholarship on property rules and liability rules). 
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a.  Prevention by property rule or liability rule 
Prevention measures (specifically external prevention)244 can 
direct behavior via liability rules or property rules. Liability-rule 
prevention charges a predictable monetary price for restricted 
behavior. Alternatively, property-rule prevention mandates 
performance on threat of imprisonment, compelled behavior, or 
escalating penalties. 
Examples of liability-rule prevention include measures that 
restrict behavior by imposing costs. For example, parking meters 
disallow parking absent a payment of either the meter rate beforehand 
or a parking ticket afterwards. Similarly, carbon taxes prohibit 
pollution without payment of a fee. Moreover, countless other fines, 
pricing mechanisms, and Pigouvian taxes245 fit this description. All 
constrain behavior subject to relatively predictable monetary costs. 
Contrarily, property-rule prevention mandates behavior on 
penalty of incarceration or other coercion. A primary example of 
property-rule prevention is criminal liability.246 Additionally, any 
prevention measures that enforce performance via punitive damage 
awards, civil contempt proceedings, or injunctions adopt a property-
rule approach. 
Prevention regimes can, and often do, combine liability rules and 
property rules. Enforcement of restricted behavior may begin with 
predictable fines (liability-rule prevention) and escalate to punitive 
monetary figures or court orders (property-rule prevention).247 For 
example, to prevent trespass, the common law imposes nominal or 
economic damages (liability-rule prevention) for isolated instances 
but injunction (property-rule prevention) for threat of repeated 
trespass. 
Liability-rule prevention can be more adaptable than property-
rule prevention, making it more appealing from some perspectives and 
 
 244. The distinction between property-rule and liability-rule enforcement is not meaningful for 
internal prevention measures, which are voluntarily adopted and thus not subject to enforcement. 
 245. “Pigouvian taxes” are fees imposed to discourage certain undesired behaviors. See, e.g., 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, 1877-1959, THE LIBR. OF ECONS. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/ 
Enc/bios/Pigou.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 246. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 243, 1192 n.164; cf. Coleman, supra note 64, at 923 
(explaining the theory behind criminal liability through a hypothetical incident in which a guitar is 
stolen). 
 247. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, 70–71. 
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less appealing from others. Since liability-rule prevention allows 
actors to either comply or pay, individuals can exercise greater choice. 
This can help reduce over-inclusive prevention, contributing to 
utilitarian social welfare and preserving greater autonomy for actors. 
However, liability-rule prevention risks being under-inclusive. 
Utilitarians might worry that it will systematically underprice harmful 
behavior, and legal moralists can criticize it for institutionalizing 
markets for immoral behavior.248 Finally, liability-rule prevention 
may be ill suited to address either the very wealthy, for whom the cost 
may be trivial, or the very poor, who may be effectively judgment 
proof and therefore unaffected by price.249 In such contexts, property-
rule prevention may be more appropriate.250 
b.  Cure by property rule or liability rule 
In the context of cure, remedies reflect either property rules or 
liability rules, depending on who determines the extent of the remedy. 
Many cure approaches employ liability rules whereby an objective 
third party designates the cost of remedying harm. For example, torts 
doctrines rely on judges or juries to award damages, and eminent 
domain looks to fair market value. 
Alternatively, some cure doctrines take a property-rule approach, 
requiring actors to satisfy victims’ wishes when remedying harms. For 
instance, courts have awarded property-rule remedies in trespass cases 
involving building encroachments, where an actor builds a structure 
that inadvertently crosses a few inches into a victim’s property.251 In 
such cases, courts have imposed injunctions that require the actor to 
either remove the encroaching structure or pay the victim’s chosen 
price.252 Some environmental statutes also apply property-rule cure 
approaches by requiring actors to undo environmental harms via 
 
 248. This opens liability-rule prevention to a natural rights criticism similar to that of cure. See 
supra Section II.A.3; Fennell, supra note 95, at 1418 (identifying “a morally grating locution like 
‘an entitlement to pollute’”); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory 
Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 360–61, 370–71 (2006) (comparing meritless institutions 
like murder and racism to somewhat-beneficial pollution, and suggesting changing naming 
conventions to address this difference). 
 249. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 18–19. 
 250. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 721. 
 251. See, e.g., Pile v Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895). 
 252. See, e.g., id. These injunctions could also be seen as ex-post prevention of future trespass, 
but since they seek to remedy victims, they better resemble cure. 
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abatement, remediation, and restoration.253 Similarly, environmental 
compensatory mitigation programs require developers to replace 
environmental function lost as a result of development.254 
The general tradeoffs between such property-rule and liability-
rule approaches are well rehearsed, but in the context of cure, a few 
bear emphasizing. First, liability-rule cure can raise utilitarian, natural 
rights, and distributive concerns if damage awards systematically 
undercompensate victims.255 If this is the case, cure is under-inclusive, 
allowing actors to externalize costs and encroach further onto victims’ 
liberties. Such externalized costs can render a nominally internal cure 
regime into a de facto external cure regime. Property-rule approaches 
can counteract such instances of under-inclusive cure by allowing 
victims to indicate what would make them whole. 
With that said, property-rule cure can also potentially lead to 
foregone beneficial behavior via both over-inclusive prevention and 
over-inclusive cure. Since property-rule damages are less predictable 
than liability-rule damages, the uncertainty over exposure could lead 
actors to over-inclusive internal prevention of desirable actions.256 
Property-rules can also create over-inclusive cure by positioning 
victims to opportunistically demand overcompensation, which would 
also create incentives for actors to refrain from desirable activities. 
Because cure imposes a transactional relationship in which the victim 
has constructively sold harm at a yet-to-be determined price, the actor 
is in a must-pay situation. If the victim can then choose the price, she 
may strategically demand an inflated or even extortionate sum, 
knowing that the harm-causing actor cannot exit the transaction and 
cannot verify her subjective valuation of the harm.257 To borrow 
economic terminology for this scenario, property-rule cure can put the 
 
 253. See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage 
to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 442 (1991); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321 (2018); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2018). 
 254. See, e.g., section 404 of the Clean Water Act wetlands program. U.S. ENV’T PROT. 
AGENCY, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-08/documents/compensatory_mitigation_factsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 255. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 731 (arguing that altering the process by which 
damages are calculated to better approximate harm would increase disputes and consume greater 
resources). 
 256. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 185, at 1730. 
 257. See, e.g., id. at 1729. 
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victim in the position to extract “appropriable quasi-rents,”258 which 
can decrease social welfare as well as infringe on the liberties of 
actors. 
c.  Graphical depiction and application to climate change 
Figures 4 summarizes property-rule and liability-rule variations 
on prevention and cure. 
Figure 4: Property-Rule and Liability-Rule Prevention and Cure 
 Property Rule Liability Rule 
Prevention 
Required performance 
enforced by imprisonment, 
compelled behavior, or 
escalating penalties  
Predictable monetary price 
for restricted behavior 
Cure Victim determines costs of remedying harm 
Objective third party 
determines costs of 
remedying harm 
 
Climate change examples help illustrate property-rule and 
liability-rule variations on prevention and cure. 
Policies to prevent climate change harms have adopted both 
property-rule and liability-rule approaches to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. For example, as discussed above, a carbon tax is a liability-
rule measure for greenhouse gas reductions. One can pay a fixed price 
to emit greenhouse gasses, and there is no upper limit on emissions. 
Thus, restricted behavior is priced not prohibited. 
Alternatively, a cap-and-trade regime reflects a property-rule 
prevention approach. Cap-and-trade policies prescribe a total level of 
greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., a cap), allocate emission entitlements 
within that cap, and then allow entitlement-holders to buy or sell 
entitlements (i.e., trade).259 This represents a property rule because it 
mandates certain performance standards: force of law prohibits 
 
 258. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 22. 
 259. Steven Nadel, More States and Provinces Adopt Carbon Pricing to Cut Emissions, 
ACEEE: BLOG (Jan. 3, 2019), https://aceee.org/blog/2019/01/more-states-and-provinces-adopt. 
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emitting greenhouse gasses beyond one’s entitlements, and it prohibits 
total emissions beyond the cap. Because cap-and-trade policies 
employ a performance-based, property-rule approach, there is no 
guaranteed opportunity to emit greenhouse gasses at a given price.260 
Rather, a would-be emitter must meet some entitlement holder’s 
chosen price or cease emitting, and the price of emission entitlements 
can increase based on subjective valuation and demand. 
Regarding cure, a property-rule approach would allow victims to 
designate the appropriate remedy for their climate change harms. 
Though such approaches are relatively uncommon, voluntary buyout 
programs for disaster-ravaged properties provide a limited example. 
Under such programs, government agencies offer to purchase 
properties damaged by climate-exacerbated disasters like storms or 
floods.261 When property owners elect to be bought-out, they 
implicitly choose the buyout price as sufficient compensation for their 
climate-harmed property.262 For property owners who opt to sell, 
voluntary buyout programs reflect property-rule cure for some climate 
harms. 
More commonly, cure for climate change harms involves liability 
rules. For instance, disaster-assistance or flood-insurance programs 
provide victims a fixed amount of compensation according to some 
schedule of relief. 
Figure 5 summarizes these climate change examples of property-
rule and liability-rule prevention and cure. 
  
 
 260. Id. 
 261. New York’s voluntary buyback program for climate-vulnerable properties is an example. 
See, e.g., Buyout and Acquisition Programs, N.Y. GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY, 
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyout-acquisition-programs (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 262. While this remedy may not be perfect, the acceptance suggests that it is adequate in the 
eyes of the participating parties. 
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Figure 5: Examples of Property-Rule and Liability-Rule 
Prevention and Cure 
 Property Rule Liability Rule 
Prevention Greenhouse gas cap-and-trade Carbon tax 
Cure Voluntary buyout participation 
Disaster assistance or flood 
insurance with fixed schedule of 
damages 
3.  Ex-Ante or Ex-Post 
Prevention and cure approaches may also employ different timing 
variations. They may deploy ex-ante measures before a given harm or 
ex-post measures after a particular harm. This distinction is relative 
rather than absolute; whether an approach is ex ante or ex post must 
be measured from a designated event. Nonetheless, the election of ex-
ante or ex-post approaches can have important practical implications. 
a.  Ex-ante and ex-post prevention 
Since prevention efforts seek to avoid harms, they can lend 
themselves to predictive, ex-ante outlooks. However, ex-post 
prevention is just as common. By instituting behavioral limits after 
some harms have occurred, ex-post prevention can benefit from 
increased knowledge and possibly offer better tailoring, albeit at the 
cost of the preceding harms. 
Ex-ante prevention seeks to anticipate and avoid harms before 
they occur. For instance, regulations limiting scientific research on 
cloning, genome editing, or infectious disease263 exemplify ex-ante 
external prevention. In the same vein, private companies sometimes 
decline to make certain technologies available to the public, or to the 
 
 263. See generally Natalie Ram, Science as Speech, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1187 (2017) (examining 
federal regulation of scientific experimentation and research). 
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military,264 out of concern about possible harms. This represents ex-
ante internal prevention, as do consolidation efforts, such as a noisy 
factory’s prospective purchase of surrounding properties. 
Prevention efforts also frequently take ex-post forms, imposing 
behavioral limits in response to harms that have already arisen. There 
are countless examples of ex-post internal prevention; these occur 
whenever an actor institutes precautions following a particular 
accident or liability. Ex-post external prevention is also routine. For 
instance, numerous federal environmental laws were enacted in 
response to environmental disasters.265 Additionally, court-ordered 
“prophylactic remedies” not only compensate for past harms but also 
compel measures to avoid similar harms.266 For instance, to redress 
sexual harassment, courts may not only assess damages (i.e., cure) but 
also require new employment practices, employee training, and 
grievance procedures (ex-post prevention).267 
The major tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post prevention 
involve knowledge limitations and avoided harms. Ex-post prevention 
can incorporate accumulated experience to inform its tailoring,268 
albeit at the cost of allowing some harms to occur. But, experience 
does not guarantee better harm avoidance, and the ex-post perspective 
may skew prevention due to cognitive biases that overweight the 
importance of recent, available, confirming, or intense information. 
On the other hand, ex-ante prevention may avoid marginally more 
foreseeable harms or irreparable losses. Further, despite (or, rather, 
because of) these knowledge limitations, ex-ante prevention may 
allow regulations (i.e., external prevention) to proceed under a sort of 
“veil of ignorance,” potentially allowing decisions to be made on 
 
 264. Cf. Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, Microsoft Workers Call for Canceling Military 
Contract for Technology that Could Turn Warfare into a “Video Game,” WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 
2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/22/microsoft-workers-
call-cancelling-military-contract-technology-that-could-turn-warfare-into-video-game/ 
(describing Microsoft’s choice to continue its relationship with the Defense Department despite 
employee concerns). 
 265. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009) (describing the history of federal environmental laws). 
 266. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 272 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 267. See Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass 
of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 352 (2002). 
 268. See Kyle D. Logue, In Praise of (Some) Ex Post Regulation: A Response to Professor 
Galle, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 122 (2016). 
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principles and without knowledge of particular winners or losers.269 
Thus, ex-ante prevention may marginally reduce interest-group 
influence. However, because a lack of experience can heighten 
knowledge limitations, ex-ante prevention increases risks of over-
inclusivity, by foreclosing too much behavior, or under-inclusivity, by 
failing to accurately predict harms. 
b.  Ex-ante and ex-post cure 
Cure frequently adopts an ex-post perspective by seeking to 
remedy existing harms. However, cure obligations can also take an ex-
ante approach by securing remedies before harms arise. 
Ex-post cure is typical of liability and social insurance structures; 
there, the occurrence of harm triggers cure obligations. Ex-ante cure 
is less common. It imposes cure obligations in anticipation of future 
harms. For example, security deposits or bonding requirements make 
actors post remedial funds before undertaking potentially harm-
causing behavior.270 Environmental mitigation or offset requirements 
similarly solicit ex-ante cure.271 For example, before destroying a 
wetland, an actor may be tasked with replacing its ecological 
function.272 
The tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post cure involve balancing 
barriers to action with assurances of compensation. Ex-post cure 
imposes lower up-front costs, but it risks actors, like judgment-proof 
defendants, who cannot remedy their harms. Ex-ante cure raises the 
initial costs of action but assures that actors can provide some measure 
of cure,273 avoiding the externalities associated with judgment-proof 
defendants.274 
 
 269. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1723–24 
(2015). 
 270. See, e.g., Maureen D. Carman, Regulatory and Transactional Bonding: A Primer on 
Surety Bonding for the Mineral Lawyer, 17 E. MIN. L. FOUND. 227, 228 (1997). 
 271. See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, Negative-Value Property, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021). 
 272. See Michael Faure & Jing Liu, New Models for the Compensation of Natural Resources 
Damage, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 261, 269 (2011–2012). 
 273. In this way ex-ante cure resembles liability-rule external prevention because it raises the 
cost of actions which leads to decreased action. However, ex-ante cure retains a major distinction 
from prevention: in the case of prevention, pricing schemes need not actually allocate revenues to 
victims. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32. However, ex-ante cure provides assurances to victims 
by holding funds for future compensation. 
 274. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 740. 
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However, because ex-ante cure requires money up front, it 
potentially imposes over-inclusive cure in the form of excessive short-
term costs. For example, some actors might ultimately be solvent for 
longer-term liabilities but may not be able to afford immediate 
bonding requirements. For those marginal actors, ex-ante cure could 
foreclose otherwise cost-effective behavior. While there are various 
ways to lower these short-term costs, the nature of ex-ante cure is that 
it will impose costs earlier than will ex-post cure. This can assure 
marginally more compensation, but it risks marginally less activity. 
c.  Graphical depiction and application to climate change 
Figures 6 summarizes ex-ante and ex-post variations on 
prevention and cure. 
Figure 6: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Prevention and Cure 
 Ex Ante Ex Post 
Prevention Behavior restricted in anticipation of future harm  
Behavior restricted in 
reaction to past harm 
Cure Cure obligation secured in advance of harm 
Cure obligation secured after 
harm  
 
The climate change context offers additional examples of ex-ante 
and ex-post prevention and cure efforts. Many greenhouse gas 
reduction policies represent ex-ante prevention because they seek to 
avoid future harms that have yet to manifest. For example, a major 
goal for emission-reduction policies is to hold global temperature rise 
below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, which will 
hopefully avoid catastrophic climate change impacts.275 
Other climate change policies represent ex-post prevention aimed 
at dodging recurrence of harms. For instance, some disaster-response 
policies buy properties flooded by climate-exacerbated storms and 
 
 275. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 160. 
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retire them from redevelopment, transforming them into greenspace 
that will not be harmed by flooding and that can buffer communities 
against future storms.276 
In terms of cure, any disaster assistance or tort liability for climate 
harms represents ex-post cure. As for ex-ante cure, examples arise 
from “managed retreat” policies that preemptively buyout and relocate 
climate-vulnerable populations, such as coastal communities 
threatened by sea level rise, when harms are foreseeable but have yet 
to occur.277 
Figure 7 summarizes these examples of ex-ante and ex-post 
prevention and cure. 
Figure 7: Examples of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Prevention and Cure 
 Ex Ante Ex Post 
Prevention 
Emissions reduction to 
hold global temperature 
rise below 2 degrees 
 
Retiring flooded properties 
and managing them as 
greenspace 
Cure 
Managed retreat policies 
 Disaster assistance and tort damages 
 
4.  Actor Presumption or Victim Presumption 
Finally, both prevention and cure regimes can assign burdens of 
proof to create presumptions in favor of either actors or victims. For 
instance, external prevention278 measures may presume an action is 
exempt from regulation unless proven otherwise (an actor 
presumption), or that an action is restricted absent contrary evidence 
 
 276. Buyout and Acquisition Programs, supra note 261. 
 277. Managed Retreat Strategies, ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.adaptation 
clearinghouse.org/resources/managed-retreat-strategies.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 278. Delineating these presumptions is immaterial for internal prevention, which involves no 
third-party arbiter to impose a burden of proof. 
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(a victim presumption).279 The FDA employs an actor presumption for 
foods derived from genetically modified plants.280 Such foods are 
“generally recognized as safe,” and thus not subject to regulations 
unless otherwise indicated.281 Conversely, some state water laws 
impose a victim presumption through the “no harm rule,” which 
disallows the transfer of water rights absent proof that the transfer will 
not harm other water users.282 
Internal and external cure regimes also create presumptions by 
allocating burdens of proof. Actor presumptions are common. For 
instance, negligence liability (internal cure) reflects an actor 
presumption; to recover, a victim must prove duty, breach, causation, 
and damages.283 Similarly, federal disaster assistance programs 
(external cure) require victims to demonstrate that they qualify for 
remedial programs.284 
Victim presumptions are rarer but still arise in both internal and 
external cure measures. For example, some radioactive waste facilities 
are presumed liable (internal cure)285 for nearby radioactive 
contamination.286 Additionally, hospital emergency rooms (external 
cure) presume that victims are entitled to curative treatment. 
a.  Graphical depiction and application to climate change 
Figure 8 summarizes actor-presumptive and victim-presumptive 
variations on prevention and cure. 
  
 
 279. The “precautionary principle” in its strong form calls for such a presumption. See, e.g., 
Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1285, 1288. 
 280. See Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992). 
 281. See id. 
 282. Scott C. Miller, Water Law 101: A Primer for Resource Developers and Landmen, 61 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., §§ 21.01–.02 (2015). 
 283. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 72. 
 284. See, e.g., Individual Assistance, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/individual-disaster-
assistance (last updated Dec. 16, 2020). 
 285. This liability constitutes internal cure because it imposes a remedial obligation on the actor 
causing the harm. Here, the provision creates a presumption of causation. However, radioactive 
waste facilities can rebut this presumption by proving that they did not cause the radioactive 
contamination. Thus, remedial obligation turns on the question of causation, making this an internal 
cure approach regardless of the presumption. 
 286. See, e.g., Pa. St. Healthcare L. Libr. 25 § 237.1 (2019). 
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Figure 8: Actor-Presumptive and Victim-Presumptive Prevention 
and Cure 
 Actor Presumption Victim Presumption 
Prevention Presumption that action is permitted  
Presumption that action is 
forbidden 
Cure Victim must prove entitlement to remedy  
Victim presumptively 
entitled to remedy  
 
Climate change policies feature a mix of actor presumptions and 
victim presumptions. For instance, California regulations adopt both 
actor-presumptive and victim-presumptive prevention measures 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions from certain activities 
are presumptively regulated, absent a “demonstration of 
nonapplicability” or “verification for reduced emissions.”287 This 
represents a victim presumption because the emissions are regulated 
unless proven otherwise. Alternately, some actions are presumed not 
to have significant greenhouse gas emission impacts.288 This is an 
actor presumption because, barring contrary evidence, these actions 
are spared regulatory obligations. 
Climate change cure can also demonstrate actor presumptions and 
victim presumptions. For instance, climate change tort liability is 
actor-presumptive; victims must prove their entitlement to a remedy. 
Alternately, managed retreat efforts can be victim-presumptive if they 
presuppose that residents of disaster-vulnerable areas are qualified for 
buyouts and relocation efforts. 
Figure 9 summarizes these examples of actor-presumptive and 
victim presumptive prevention and cure. 
 
 287. CAL. AIR RES. BD., UNOFFICIAL ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THE REGULATION FOR THE 
MANDATORY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS § 95101(g)–(h) (Apr. 2019), 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/regulation/mrr-2018-unofficial-2019-4-3.pdf. 
 288. See BAY AREA QUALITY MGMT. DIST., CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT: 
AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES (May 2017), https://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-and-
research/ceqa/ceqa_guidelines_may2017-pdf.pdf. 
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Figure 9: Examples of Actor-Presumptive and Victim-
Presumptive Prevention and Cure 
 Actor Presumption Victim Presumption 
Prevention 
Actions presumed not to 
have significant emissions 
impacts 
Actions with presumptively 
regulated emissions 
Cure Tort Geography-based managed retreat 
B.  Complementary Prevention and Cure Measures 
As the previous section detailed, different alignments of the 
prevention-and-cure variations can produce nuanced individual policy 
measures. Still, any individual measure in isolation is limited and will 
risk over- or under-inclusivity. Combining mutually reinforcing 
prevention and cure measures allows for more holistic policy 
approaches that can mitigate instances of over- and under-inclusivity. 
This section identifies particularly complementary variations and 
combinations of prevention and cure. 
1.  Addressing Under-inclusive Prevention 
External prevention risks being under-inclusive due to knowledge 
limitations and interest-group influence. Reinforcing external 
prevention with internal cure measures can help counteract this under-
inclusivity. 
External prevention measures will rarely be perfectly calibrated 
to avoid harm.289 Knowledge limitations will leave some harms 
unanticipated, and political pressures may drive policies to favor 
particular interests at the expense of avoiding harms.290 As a result, 
 
 289. Even if prevention efforts were perfectly tailored, some residual risk of harm would 
remain. 
 290. See supra Section III.A. Internal cure can also struggle from knowledge limitations and 
can be reinforced by internal prevention. 
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external prevention measures are apt to struggle with under-
inclusivity. 
Internal cure can alleviate such under-inclusivity by providing 
relief to victims and by creating incentives for actors to exercise well-
tailored internal prevention. For victims suffering un-avoided harms, 
internal cure provides recourse.291 Moreover, by forcing actors to 
internalize costs, internal cure creates incentives to foresee and avoid 
potential harms via internal prevention. This helps mitigate the 
knowledge limitations that beset external prevention, and it can help 
temper interest-group influence on regulations.292 For example, even 
if industry lobbying has secured favorable treatment such as minimal 
regulation or nugatory safety requirements (under-inclusive external 
prevention), the prospect of meaningful liability (internal cure 
obligations) creates incentives for cost-effective precautions (internal 
prevention). Thus, robust internal cure293 can mollify the potential 
under-inclusivity of external prevention. 
2.  Addressing Over-inclusive Prevention 
Uncertainty over liabilities can push internal prevention toward 
over-inclusivity, potentially impeding desirable behavior. However, 
particular cure variations can help increase certainty about liabilities 
and thereby abate over-inclusive internal prevention. For instance, 
liability-rule cure offers more predictable remedies than does 
property-rule cure. Indeed, the examples of efficient breach discussed 
in Parts I and III294 demonstrate how predictable liability-rule cure (in 
the form of expectancy damages) is crucial for calibrating internal 
prevention in that context. Additionally, ex-ante cure, such as bonding 
requirements, offers actors certainty about their potential liabilities by 
requiring that obligations be paid in advance. Adopting such cure 
variations to reduce uncertainty can help actors tailor internal 
prevention to avoid over-inclusivity. 
 
 291. This is so if it is not under-inclusive. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 292. Cf. Buzbee, supra note 167, at 1598 (advocating for policies that allow citizens and groups 
to influence regulatory choices). 
 293. This requires ensuring that cure is truly internal. 
 294. See supra Section I.B.1. and Section III.A.3. 
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3.  Addressing Under-inclusive Cure 
Under-inclusive cure can under-protect victims and create 
problematic incentives for actors. 
To address victims’ under-inclusivity concerns, cure regimes can 
adopt property-rule, victim-presumptive, and ex-ante cure variations. 
Property-rule cure empowers victims to designate satisfying remedies, 
victim-presumptive cure increases victims’ access to remedies, and 
ex-ante cure guards against judgment-proof actors. Combining some 
or all of these variations helps shield victims against under-inclusive 
cure, regardless of whether a cure regime is internal or external. 
The distinction between internal and external cure becomes 
important regarding under-inclusive cure’s incentives for actors. Since 
internal cure forces actors to internalize harms, it creates incentives 
for cost-effective precautions (internal prevention). Thus, internal cure 
measures coupled with property rules, victim presumptions, and ex-
ante obligations militate against under-inclusive cure’s problematic 
incentives and its under-compensation. 
However, some instances of under-inclusive cure intentionally 
subsidize actors, and it may prove politically infeasible to implement 
robust internal cure, much less to couple it with property rules, victim 
presumptions, and ex-ante obligations. In this case, external cure in 
the form of social insurance may be preferable to address the 
drawbacks of under-inclusive cure. Such social insurance could still 
ensure that victims are made whole, especially if it employs property 
rules or victim-presumptions. It could also retain subsidies for actors, 
spreading the subsidy costs over society rather than concentrating 
them on victims. 
Finally, external prevention can reinforce these cure variations in 
addressing under-inclusive cure. Regulations can generally 
complement internal and external cure regimes by guiding behavior to 
reduce residual risk, thereby decreasing instances of harm that provide 
opportunities for under-inclusive cure. More specifically, external 
prevention can couple with external cure to allow the benefits of social 
insurance while still ensuring certain levels of precaution, thereby 
avoiding increases in residual risk. This combination allows policies 
to simultaneously protect victims and subsidize actors against liability 
(both through social insurance), while still requiring actors to take 
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some desirable precautions (through external prevention) that the 
subsidized liability would otherwise undermine. 
To illustrate this dynamic, recall the hypothetical dangerous 
industry, where if negligence leads to a fatality, a firm’s total expected 
cost is $2 million per fatality.295 Through precautions that are cost-
effective under the negligence regime, a firm could avoid all but two 
fatalities per year. 
Now, imagine that the relevant cure regime changes from 
negligence (internal cure) to social insurance (external cure), whereby 
victims still receive $2 million per fatality, but the firm contributes 
only $500,000 of that amount. This social insurance subsidy changes 
the firm’s calculation of cost-effective precaution. Since the firm bears 
a much lower cost per fatality, more fatalities per year become cost 
effective, and the firm will likely reduce precautions accordingly. In 
turn, this increases residual risk. The firm’s former cost-effective 
precautions prevented all but two yearly fatalities; the firm’s new cost-
effective precautions will allow more than two annual fatalities. 
To counteract this effect, external prevention can complement 
social insurance. For instance, a regulation could require the firm to 
maintain precautions that prevent all but two yearly fatalities. This 
would allow for the same social insurance benefits (guaranteeing 
victims $2 million per fatality while reducing the firm’s liability costs 
to $500,000 per fatality), but it would also maintain precaution levels 
to avoid a spike in residual risk. 
4.  Addressing Over-inclusive Cure 
When over-inclusive cure induces over-compensation, it can 
stifle desirable behavior, and property-rule cure risks just such 
overcompensation by potentially allowing victims to make strategic 
inflated demands. However, combining property-rule cure with 
complementary strategies can temper this risk. First, coupling 
property-rules with external cure in the form of social insurance can 
ease overcompensation burdens on actors. Second, limiting property-
rule cure to particular subject matters or coupling it with internal 
prevention approaches like consolidation can limit the potential for 
opportunistic demands that generate overcompensation. Finally, 
 
 295. See supra Section IV.A.1.a. 
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blending the previous two strategies, social insurance could provide 
property-rule cure only in situations that limit opportunistic demands. 
First, property rules linked with social insurance can spread the 
cost of cure broadly. For example, imagine that victims can name their 
price for any nuisance harms caused by a noisy factory (property-rule 
cure), but that the local municipality subsidies half the cost of all these 
nuisance liabilities. Here victims may potentially demand 
overcompensation, and the municipal subsidy would not remove the 
possibility of such strategic behavior. In fact, it may increase the 
likelihood by creating deeper pockets to meet such demands. 
However, the subsidy could prevent concentrated overcompensation 
burdens on the factory, allowing for the property-rule cure without 
chilling desirable factory operations. 
Second, to check overcompensation, property-rule cure could 
apply only in situations where opportunistically inflating costs is 
difficult. Such situations can arise from particular subject matters or 
from prior agreements. For example, when cure entails demonstrable, 
verifiable performance, victims cannot easily inflate harms. For 
instance, tearing down an encroaching structure, remediating 
pollution, or replacing ecological function are all tethered to verifiable 
results.296 Because these measures of cure are performance based, they 
restrict the possibility of victims seeking overcompensation.297 
Similarly, prior agreements can also create measurable gauges of 
harm, thereby limiting room for opportunistic demands. For instance, 
liquidated damages clauses in contracts allow potential victims to state 
in advance their expected measure of subjective harm,298 thereby 
bounding potential remedy requests. Asking would-be victims to 
anticipate harms in advance may not give a perfect measure of actual 
harms, but it allows cure approaches to honor victims’ stated prices 
(i.e., apply property rules) without too much concern about strategic 
behavior.299 
 
 296. They may still leave room to argue about the extent and quality of the necessary 
performance, but they are at least measurably performance based. 
 297. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722–23 (identifying disadvantages of liability 
rules). 
 298. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 25. 
 299. Additionally, property rules can encourage ex-ante bargaining in these contexts. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 70 (4th ed. 1992); Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 9, at 722. 
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Such use of prior agreements shows how internal prevention via 
consolidation can complement property-rule cure. For example, 
imagine that a noisy factory contracts with neighboring Victim, 
agreeing that the factory will pay Victim a set price if it emits loud 
noise that disturbs Victim’s property. This contract represents internal 
prevention via consolidation (the factory has prevented Victim’s 
realization of harm), and it enables internal property-rule cure because 
Victim will receive her chosen price (the agreed contract price) for the 
noisy harm. All the while, because the price is settled in advance, the 
contract limits the risk of Victim’s opportunistic demands. 
Finally, property-rule cure regimes can combine social insurance 
with verifiable measures of harm. For example, imagine that a 
municipality wishes to subsidize a local noisy factory. The 
municipality could commit to share the cost of the factory’s noise 
contracts with its neighbors. This scenario combines internal 
prevention (consolidation via noise contracts) with external cure (the 
municipality shares the cost of curing the factory’s noise harms) that 
simultaneously guarantees property-rule cure (victims receive their 
chosen price for noise) and limits opportunistic behavior (the price is 
agreed in advance). 
C.  Prevention and Cure in Integrated Policy Landscapes 
Building on the previous sections, this section examines how 
different prevention and cure measures interlace to form integrated 
policy landscapes. In particular, it analyzes how layered sets of 
external-prevention, cure, and internal-prevention measures compose 
the policy structures surrounding motorist behavior and climate 
change. These applications showcase the descriptive and prescriptive 
capacity of the prevention-and-cure framework. The analysis of 
motorist behavior demonstrates how interrelated prevention and cure 
measures can coalesce into a coherent policy landscape. Conversely, 
examination of climate change policy reveals individual prevention 
and cure measures working largely in isolation, which hampers their 
singular and cumulative effectiveness. This structural analysis 
identifies complementary measures, particularly internal cure, that can 
reinforce climate change policy. 
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1.  Motorist Behavior 
A congruous web of prevention and cure measures governs 
motorist behavior. Figure 10 depicts the policy landscape, and 
subsequent sections discuss relevant external-prevention, cure, and 
internal-prevention measures in detail. The final section analyzes how 
these measures interact to form a consonant and consistent policy 
landscape. 
Figure 10: Motorist Behavior Policy Landscape 
a.  External prevention 
A variety of external prevention measures restrict motorist 
behavior, with different approaches tailored to the desirability of 
different actions. 
For extremely undesirable behavior, like vehicular assault, a 
maximum-prevention approach involves: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) property-rule, 
3) external prevention, with 
4) a victim presumption. 
This configuration describes criminalization of behavior. The 
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harmful unless proven otherwise (victim presumption); the restriction 
attaches prior to harm occurring (ex-ante); and it is enforced via 
imprisonment (property-rule). 
However, such maximum prevention is overkill for unwanted 
behavior, like speeding, that is undesirable but not as offensive. 
Adjusting one variation, by shifting from a property rule to a liability 
rule, offers a less stringent prevention approach: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) liability-rule, 
3) external prevention, with 
4) a victim presumption. 
This describes traffic restrictions like speed limits. The state still 
restricts behavior (external prevention); the behavior is presumed 
harmful unless proven otherwise (victim presumption); and the 
restriction attaches prior to harm occurring (ex-ante). However, now 
the prevention is enforced via a fine (liability-rule). 
For generally desirable behavior, prevention approaches become 
less restrictive still. To accomplish this, the configuration can adjust 
from victim presumption (behavior is restricted unless proven 
otherwise) to actor presumption (behavior is unrestricted unless 
proven otherwise). This change yields: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) liability-rule, 
3) external prevention, with 
4) an actor presumption. 
This captures measures like weight and height restrictions for 
trucks on particular bridges or roads. Under such restrictions, most 
driving is allowed, but certain instances of demonstrably harmful 
driving (weights or heights that prove harmful to infrastructure) are 
subject to penalty. 
b.  Cure 
Turning to cure, since all prevention efforts, even maximally 
restrictive ones, leave residual risk, some harms will inevitably occur 
from driving. Addressing such harms requires cure measures, which 
can differ across causes or types of harm. 
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To address harms caused by everyday behavior, such as damages 




3) internal cure, with 
4) an actor presumption. 
This captures a negligence standard. Once a harm arises (ex-post), 
if the victim can prove the elements of liability (actor presumption), 
then the harm-causing actor must remedy the harm (internal cure) by 
paying a court-determined sum (liability-rule). 
Alternatively, to address harms from particularly dangerous 
driving, the configuration can adjust to allow easier recovery for 
victims. This yields: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) liability-rule, 
3) internal cure, with 
4) a victim presumption. 
Now dangerous drivers who may cause harms must provide 
remedies (internal cure) prospectively in the form of a bond (ex-ante), 
and once the harm arises, the actor faces strict liability (victim 
presumption) for a court-determined sum (liability-rule). Commercial 
drivers carrying hazardous materials face cure structures like this.300 
Finally, to address the accumulated harms that driving causes to 
roads, a broad remedial configuration can impose: 
1) ex-post, 
2) property-rule, 
3) external cure, with 
4) a victim presumption. 
This resembles the use of general tax funds to repair roads.301 
Road damage arises from diffuse actors, but general taxes extend even 
beyond the group that causes the harm, for example by reaching 
infrequent drivers and non-drivers. As a result, harm-causing actors 
 
 300. See Insurance Filing Requirements, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration/insurance-requirements (last updated Dec. 16, 2019). 
 301. See, e.g., Tony Dutzik & Gideon Weissman, Who Pays for Roads? How the “Users Pay” 
Myth Gets in the Way of Solving America’s Transportation Problems, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND & 
FRONTIER GRP. (2015), https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Who%20Pays%20for%20Roads 
%20vUS.pdf. (documenting the extent to which general tax funds are used to pay for highways). 
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partially externalize costs (external cure). Further, taxpayers pay this 
cure by default (victim presumption). Finally, the cure is performance 
based (property-rule); the total cure obligation is whatever emerges as 
the ultimate cost of fixing the road.302 
c.  Internal prevention 
All of the cure obligations in the previous section create 
incentives that influence internal prevention measures, such as how 
and how-often people drive. 
For example, under the negligence standard, drivers face cure 
obligations if victims prove harms caused by unreasonable driving. 
This creates incentives for ex-ante, internal prevention, like driving 
with reasonable care.303 However, the negligence regime is not so 
onerous as to greatly decrease driving. 
If cure obligations are more victim-oriented than the negligence 
standard—for example, if cure includes victim presumptions and ex-
ante bonding requirements—the increased liability creates incentives 
for more extensive ex-ante, internal prevention. Faced with such cure 
duties, drivers may both increase precautions and decrease activity 
levels.304 So, for example, hazardous material carriers may conduct 
more frequent safety checks on equipment, or some commercial 
drivers may choose not to carry hazardous materials. 
Finally, a broad remedial standard, such as general tax funds for 
road repair, is unlikely to incentivize private prevention. Because the 
external cure structure spreads costs disproportionately to the causes 
of harm, it diminishes incentives for particular harm-causing actors 
(such as frequent drivers, drivers of heavy vehicles, or drivers who use 
snow-chains) to undertake precautions or decrease behavior. 
 
 302. Such costs frequently overrun third-party measurements like bids or estimates. Cf. 
Dakshina G. De Silva et al., Project Modifications and Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions 
1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2015-14, 2015), https://www.frbatlanta.org/-
/media/Documents/research/publications/wp/2015/14.pdf (describing specific difficulties inherent 
in highway construction auctions). 
 303. For careless drivers who have been liable for harms, the experience of having paid 
damages may lead to ex-post internal prevention, such as driving with even greater care. 
 304. Increased liability can make additional precautions cost-effective. Cf. STEARNS ET AL., 
supra note 32, at 74 (describing the relationship between liability, precautions, and costs). 
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d.  The policy landscape surrounding motorist behavior 
The combination of prevention and cure measures addressing 
motorist behavior knit together to form a relatively integrated and 
reinforcing policy landscape. The various external prevention 
measures calibrate different deterrence levels for more- and less-
desirable behaviors. Additionally, the external prevention measures 
work in concert with the cure measures. For example, by regulating 
speeding and restricting vehicle weight and height, the external 
prevention measures reduce residual risk below what might otherwise 
be cost-effective under a negligence cure regime. At the same time, 
the internal-cure provisions, such as negligence and strict liability, 
counteract potentially under-inclusive regulations (external 
prevention) by incentivizing tailored internal-prevention measures. 
The cure measures also mitigate under-inclusive prevention by 
addressing unforeseen or unavoidable harms. Finally, the variety of 
complementary cure measures helps balance concerns about over- and 
under-inclusive cure. Negligence measures seek to optimally 
compensate victims while not over-deterring beneficial driving, strict 
liability guarantees victims remedies for injuries from hazardous 
activities, and external-cure measures guard against potential under-
inclusive funding for road repairs. 
Thus, the prevention and cure measures governing motorist 
behavior form a generally cohesive policy landscape. This does not 
immunize each individual measure from criticism, and indeed the 
prevention-and-cure framework helps identify potentially problematic 
measures and suggest strategies for improvement.305 Nonetheless, 
accepting that individual measures are (and will always be) imperfect, 
this integrated collection of prevention and cure measures coherently 
addresses motorist behavior. 
2.  Climate Change 
In contrast with the congruous policy landscape surrounding 
motorist behavior, the individual prevention and cure measures 
addressing climate change are largely independent and isolated, 
 
 305. For instance, if in practice the negligence standard represents de-facto external cure 
because victims are unable to consistently carry their burden of proof, this may counsel adopting 
different cure variations, such as victim presumptions, to internalize costs and reinforce internal 
prevention. 
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limiting the efficacy of each measure and leaving significant gaps in 
climate policy. Figure 11 depicts the climate change policy landscape, 
and later sections explore the external-prevention, cure, and internal-
prevention measures aimed at climate change harms. The final section 
explains why this assembly of prevention and cure measures remains 
disjointed, and it highlights tactics to help integrate climate policy. 
Figure 11: Climate Change Policy Landscape 
a.  External prevention 
Unlike the external prevention measures addressing motorist 
behavior, which are common and generally consistent across the 
United States, external prevention of climate change is relatively 
uncommon and highly inconsistent. Until recently, there were no 
external-prevention efforts to avoid climate harms by curbing 
greenhouse gas emissions, and currently there remains little external 
prevention at the federal level and in many states.306 However, some 
states have adopted external-prevention efforts to reduce emissions, 
and other jurisdictions may consider implementing such measures.307 
 
 306. See Nadel, supra note 259. 
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Examining the prevailing external prevention approaches helps 
uncover their different attributes and advantages. 
Among external-prevention options, a carbon tax, which requires 
greenhouse gas emitters to pay per unit of emission, may be least 
restrictive (depending on the price of the tax). A carbon tax represents: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) liability rule, 
3) external prevention, with 
4) a victim presumption. 
Carbon taxes are government-imposed measures (external 
prevention) that regulate greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate future 
climate harms (ex-ante).308 They impose a given price for emissions 
(liability-rule), and emissions are presumptively subject to the tax 
(victim presumption). The higher the carbon-tax price, the more it will 
reduce emissions, but a carbon tax itself does not set a total limit on 
emissions. Rather, actors can emit as much greenhouse gas as they can 
afford.309 
No states currently impose carbon tax policies, though 
Washington and Massachusetts have considered it.310 Additionally, 
the City of Boulder, Colorado as well as two Canadian provinces 
employ carbon taxes.311 
Potentially more restrictive than a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade 
approach employs a property rule rather than a liability rule. A cap-
and-trade policy represents: 
1) ex-ante, 
2) property-rule, 
3) external prevention, with 
4) a victim presumption 
Like a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade program is a government-
imposed regulation (external prevention) that seeks to avoid future 
climate harms (ex-ante), and emissions are presumptively subject to 
the cap-and-trade program (victim presumption). However, unlike a 
carbon-tax, a cap-and-trade program adopts a property-rule structure 
by requiring performance (a cap on total emissions). Thus, while both 
 
 308. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 126. 
 309. See id. 
 310. Nadel, supra note 259. 
 311. Id. 
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cap-and-trade and carbon-tax approaches can theoretically reduce 
emissions to the same extent, cap-and-trade programs can do so more 
directly. Currently, eleven states employ some version of cap and 
trade.312 
Other relatively common greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
efforts include renewable portfolio standards,313 fuel efficiency 
standards,314 and commitments to zero-carbon development.315 These 
all impose performance standards on certain emitting sources, so like 
cap-and-trade regimes, these measures represent 1) ex-ante, 2) 
property rule, 3) external prevention with 4) a victim presumption. 
b.  Cure 
As for cure, there is currently little practical prospect of internal 
cure for climate harms, so effectively all climate change cure is 
external. The details of the relevant cure configurations help explain 
why. 
 
 312. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have active cap and trade systems. Jason Ye, 
U.S. State Carbon Pricing Policies, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/document/us-state-carbon-pricing-policies/ (last updated June 2020). These 
states represent “over a quarter of the U.S. population and account for a third of U.S. GDP.” Id. 
Additionally, Virginia has indicated a willingness to join a cap-and-trade program. Sarah Rankin, 
Virginia Moves Toward Joining Cap-and-Trade Program, AP NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://apne 
ws.com/article/virginia-climate-change-business-ccc455631eee64caf01aff0765c849d4. 
 313. Renewable portfolio standards require that by a certain future date a given percentage of 
electricity sold in the jurisdiction must come from renewable (typically low- or zero-carbon) 
sources. See Richard Bowers, Updated Renewable Portfolio Standards Will Lead to More 
Renewable Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38492. At least 29 states have adopted some 
form of renewable portfolio standard. Id. 
 314. Fuel efficiency standards aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by requiring that 
vehicles sold in future years meet minimum fuel efficiencies (typically minimum miles per gallon). 
The federal government imposes some fuel efficiency standards. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY, https://www.nhtsa.gov/laws-
regulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 315. Zero-carbon or “net zero” development goals include municipal commitments that all 
buildings in a city will be carbon-neutral by a given date. See, e.g., N.Y.C. COUNCIL, CLIMATE 
MOBILIZATION ACT, https://council.nyc.gov/data/green/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); Press 
Release, New York City Council, Council to Vote on Climate Mobilization Act Ahead of Earth 
Day (Apr. 18, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2019/04/18/1730/ (requiring building retrofits 
that will reduce emissions by 80% by 2050). 
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Tort liability potentially provides internal cure to address climate 
change harms,316 but its actor-presumptive structure has proven a 
major barrier for victims seeking remedies. The relevant tort regimes, 
such as negligence or nuisance, are typically: 
1) ex-post, 
2) liability-rule, 
3) internal cure, with 
4) an actor presumption. 
In any context an actor presumption can impede victims’ access 
to cure, but in climate change cases, the actor presumption poses a 
particularly high hurdle. For example, scientific uncertainty over 
causation of climate harms leaves plaintiffs with a daunting burden in 
pressing their claims. This makes internal cure for climate harms 
practically unavailable. 
As a result, external cure is, de facto, the exclusive option for 
victims of climate change harms such as floods or wildfires. Victims 
may be forced to bear such harms themselves, but in some cases social 
insurance is available, such as through flood-insurance or disaster-
assistance programs. Such programs represent: 
1) ex-post, 
2) liability-rule, 
3) external cure, with 
4) an actor presumption. 
These programs are funded disproportionally to climate change 
causation (external cure), and they respond to harms that have already 
occurred (ex-post). Victims must prove that they qualify for the 
programs (actor presumption), and if so, they receive some objective 
measure of relief (liability-rule). 
As an alternative to this ex-post approach, prospective managed 
retreat programs potentially provide ex-ante, external cure for some 
climate change victims. Because such programs seek to preemptively 
relocate vulnerable populations before disastrous climate change 




 316. However, even bringing a tort claim in this context requires overcoming justiciability 
issues, and a number of courts have dismissed such claims on justiciability issues related to 
positivism. See supra Section IV.C.2.c. 
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3) external cure, with 
4) a victim presumption 
c.  Internal prevention 
The limited prospect of internal-cure obligations for climate 
change harms offers little meaningful incentive for internal prevention 
measures. However, some individuals and organizations still 
undertake voluntary internal prevention. For instance, some 
individuals perform internal, ex-ante prevention by attempting to 
lower their carbon footprints. Similarly, some organizations engage in 
ex-ante internal prevention through commitments to lowering 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Victims of climate-change-exacerbated harms may also adopt ex-
post, internal prevention, such as by relocating to avoid future climate 
harms or by modifying their homes to be more resilient (e.g., raising a 
house above flood level). However, the availability of external cure 
like disaster assistance or subsidized flood insurance can reduce 
incentives for such precautions and encourage victims to remain in 
climate-vulnerable areas.317 
d.  The policy landscape surrounding climate change 
The policy landscape surrounding climate change is patchy and 
disconnected, hampering its effectiveness. Practically speaking, this is 
unsurprising. As evidenced by the hearty climate change denial by 
executives and legislators at both the federal and state levels, many 
jurisdictions effectively do not consider climate change a harm.318 
Thus, there are relatively few prevention or cure measures addressing 
climate change, and climate policy may be feeble by design. 
Nonetheless, analyzing climate change policy structure helps to 
precisely critique its gaps and to inform future efforts at improvement. 
External prevention of climate change presents enormous risk of 
under-inclusion (or, possibly, over-inclusion, if one believes 
emissions reductions are unnecessary). Obviously, the fact that only a 
minority of U.S. jurisdictions regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
diminishes the likelihood of avoiding climate harms. Moreover, huge 
 
 317. See generally Pappas & Flatt, supra note 131 (describing the cycle of repetitive losses in 
communities vulnerable to natural disasters and recovery from insurance companies). 
 318. See supra Part IV. 
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knowledge limitations afflict efforts to tailor appropriate greenhouse 
gas reduction measures. Further, the potential financial impacts of 
greenhouse gas restrictions attract the influence of many powerful 
interest groups looking to shape regulations to their advantage.319 
The status of climate change cure measures exacerbates these 
potential problems. The lack of meaningful internal cure undercuts 
incentives for internal prevention, meaning that climate policy wastes 
the potential for internal cure to mitigate under-inclusive prevention. 
Moreover, the functional absence of internal cure likely causes under-
inclusive cure by leaving victims without recourse. 
While external-cure measures, like disaster assistance or flood 
insurance, may seek to help such victims, these programs too are 
under-inclusive because not all victims qualify or receive satisfactory 
remedies.320 At the same time, these external-cure programs also cause 
moral hazard problems that undermine victims’ incentives to adopt 
internal prevention. For example, the prospect of disaster assistance 
can perpetuate risky development and redevelopment in climate-
vulnerable areas. While external-prevention measures, such as 
regulations limiting such hazardous development, could help 
counteract these problems, disaster-assistance and flood-insurance 
programs do not effectively incorporate such development 
restrictions.321 
Finally, climate policy fails to make the most of voluntary internal 
prevention efforts. Such internal prevention measures, like diffuse 
efforts to reduce carbon footprints, could benefit from greater 
coordination via external-prevention guidance. 
Because current climate policy does not harness complementary 
prevention and cure measures, it ends up being less than the sum of its 
parts. It relies on disparate, isolated policies, missing opportunities for 
reinforcing measures to either amplify effectiveness or check over- 
and under-inclusive tendencies. In particular, one of the most glaring 
gaps is the lack of meaningful internal cure. This aspect of climate 
policy severs many complementary links between prevention and 
 
 319. For example, political pressure may mean that regulations never restrict greenhouse gas 
emissions stringently enough. 
 320. See generally Pappas & Flatt, supra note 131 (discussing the inadequacies of current 
available remedies for climate disasters). 
 321. Id. 
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cure, and providing more potent internal cure represents a key step for 
creating more integrated policies. While the irreversible impacts of 
climate change may call for a strong dose of prevention, such 
prevention would be enhanced by well-matched cure. 
CONCLUSION 
Prevention and cure are foundational elements of legal 
architecture, spanning diverse substantive areas and normative 
commitments. A nuanced framework of prevention and cure provides 
both overarching theoretical perspectives and specific practical 
insights into the structure of law and policy. 
 
